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1. Property rights in a long term perspective
Rent-extraction activities traditionally played an important role in Brazil since
colonial times, witness the central role played by farmed out monopolies and tax
contracts and the many restrictions affecting economic activities. Much has been written
about property rights in Imperial Brazil (1822-1889) but most of it dealt with either land
property rights or slave-owning during the transition to a free-labour regime. Labour
policies played a major role in Brazil since  colonial times as the government underlined
permanently the dominance of the objective of maintaining low manpower costs
throughout the period. Requiring net slave imports the Brazilian economy was
particularly vulnerable to an interruption of the slave trade. Thus, in the 19th century,
the commitments to cease slave imports in 1830 were openly disregarded for 20 years
and enforcement came only as a direct result of British pressure through the Royal Navy,
especially in the second half of the 1840s.
As the final abolition of slavery took place -- without compensation to owners --
only in 1888, the transition to free labour remained one of the important economic issues
during the Empire. As free labour was attracted to Brazil, land legislation became a
crucial element of wage determination of free labour. In spite of land legislation in the
first half of the 1850s which would have allowed land ownership by immigrants, actual
control of the land (posse) and the ability to preserve this control were the really crucial
factors. Land ownership in the agricultural frontier was to be defined by continuous
occupation and was consequently beyond the reach of most immigrants. Land was
available in theory but mostly to the powerful large-scale squatter occupying the
agricultural frontier and not to the immigrant. Otherwise wages would increase and
could affect the long term profitability of plantation agriculture as it would be expected
from the “Domar hypothesis”. The legalization of land ownership was a protracted
process and one in which political power and outward violence at the local level played a
decisive role. As Dean (1971) puts it: “Posse [actual control of the land] fundamentally3
denied the authority of the state. The Crown had to be able to maintain its rights over
public lands and - even more important - it had to establish a legitimate means of
alienating them. If most of the lands in private hands was illegally acquired, then how
was the state to guarantee any individual’s property rights?”
2 There was thus no clear
long term definition of property rights concerning two of the most important non-
financial assets in Imperial Brazil: land and slaves.  In both cases government action
could (and in the case of slaves did) disregard individual and legally registered private
property rights.
Both the question of labor supply, involving slavery and European immigration,
and the process of occupation of new lands in the 19th century have been the object of
numerous studies. However, practically nothing has been written on property rights and
fiscal and financial matters in Imperial Brazil. It is thus important to underline from the
start the exploratory nature of this paper. North and Weingast (1989) stress the
importance of constitutional developments due to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in
England as a powerful factor in explaining the development of the capital markets due to
the inducement to lend made possible by an improvement in property rights. The
question at issue was the protection of private property “from the depredations of the
sovereign”
3, something which was made possible by the greater strength of Parliament
and the increased independence of common-law courts. North and Weingast’s analysis
has been complemented in certain aspects and especially so in relation to the role of
indirect debt by the sovereign through joint stock companies.
4. But the essential link
between strenghtening of property rights and consolidation of financial markets remains
the main focus of interest.
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In  Brazil the conventional analysis has to suffer significant adjustments. The idea
of an evolutionary long-term strengthening of property rights, going hand in hand with
the shift of political power from the Crown to Parliament, is much less clear than in more
advanced economies.
            In that context, it is important to define what is the meaning of property rights
for the purposes of this paper. Clearly what  is being examined is not the existence or
absense of legislation involving private law and defining the right of individuals to own
private property and to dispose of it or the security of private contracts. The notion of
private property or property rights in that sense, and rules to make them enforceable in
courts of law, had clearly been established to some extent in 16th century Portugal and
had been inherited by Colonial Brazil, where houses, slaves, cattle, plantations and
various types of assets and merchandise were the object of inheritance as well as of
private contracts of purchase and sale, while bills of exchange were used in commercial
transactions.
What is the main concern of this study is how the government on specific
occasions might infringe those rights by undermining the value of financial assets held by
individuals (in Brazil or abroad) through its fiscal or financial policies or through actions
similar to outright confiscation, akin to “the depredations of the Sovereign”.
       In that broader view, several more advanced economies were not immune to
infringement of property rights by their governments in the 19th century through such
actions as the repudiation of the public debt, debasement of the metallic currency or the
forced circulation of paper money and through extraordinary taxation and creation of an
inflationary environment or of political instability which actually corroded the real values
of assets, in spite of the existence of well-defined private ownership and the theoretical
legal security of private contracts.5
         In contrast with former colonies of Great Britain, Brazil could never look at
Portugal, and particularly at Portuguese financial institutions, as paradigms to be closely
followed, since the former, even though the metropolitan power, remained a rather
underdeveloped economy facing difficulties of financial consolidation akin to those faced
by its former colony, in spite of some episodes of financial creativity. The paradigm was
Britain, even if the institutional inheritance was strongly Portuguese.  The whole
institutional context including the strong powers of the king could fail, as already
mentioned, to provide protection from government action to real assets such as land and
slaves in real practice, even though in theory the prevailing legal system based on Roman
Law clearly allowed such assets to be legally registered under the names of their owners.
Property rights were fragile and constantly undermined in the colonial period and part of
that fragility filtered to the 19th century. This paper is a preliminary investigation
concentrating only on the projections of such characteristics on the fiscal and financial
systems developed in Brazil during the Empire (1822-1889).
After this introduction, section 2 of the paper considers the colonial heritage from
the perspective of  fiscal and monetary regimes. A short section 3 briefly sketches the
direct and indirect costs of independence from a financial point of view. The next two
sections consider in sucession fiscal policies and monetary aspects of Brazilian finance
during the Empire. Aspects related to revenue, expenditure, public debt  and the political
economy of  public finance are examined in section 4. The next section covers monetary
issues: changing monetary standards, the several versions of a Banco do Brasil, the
alternation of restrictive and lax monetary regimes, changes of policy affecting the note
issuing rights of private banks. Section 6 presents the provisional conclusions.
2. The Colonial heritage
 Production of sugar was the first economic activity in Brazil in the 16th century
which led to the permanent settlement of the colony and which also gave rise to its first
fiscal apparatus. The establishment of a royal government in Bahia in 1549 resulted in the6
appointment of a provedor-mor da fazenda, the main fiscal crown official in the colony,
responding directly to Lisbon. The main principles and “regulations of the regimentos of
the provedor-mor and of the partial provedores of the royal treasury were maintained,
with slight changes, during the whole colonial period”. The provedor-mor was to
establish a customs house (alfândega), with the appropriate books of revenues and
expenditures, of the updated regulations and provisions for the levy of rights. He should
also organize a house for the royal treasury business (casa de contos), having with that
objective “all the books necessary, one to register revenues and their titles, another of
forais and regimentos, provisions, salaries, contracts, rents, etc.”  His attributions also
included the organization of customs and contos houses such as those in Bahia in all the
captaincies. He should separate revenues according to branches and auction their
contracts, demanding guarantees from the contractors, following the treasury regimento
enforced in Portugal. He was also to demand from the provedores in each captancy to
present annual accounts of revenues and expenditures and require that they send the
balance to the treasurer resident in Bahia. The staff of the provedor-mor was to
constitute the first fiscal and financial bureaucracy in Brazil, and reflected, at an early
date, the objective of the Portuguese crown of guaranteeing  rent-extraction from
Brazil.
5
The initial revenues to the crown from the colony originated from brazilwood, in
the early 16th century. The cutting and exportation of that dyewood was successively the
object of a monopoly contract, temporary free exploitation and again a monopoly farmed
out to contractors. However, the principal economic activity developed in Brazil in the
second half of the 16th century was sugar production. “From 1580 to 1680, Brazil
[would be] the world’s largest producer and exporter of sugar.”
6 Thus, in addition to the
already existing income from brazilwood, the “most important tax [was] constituted by
the dízimo, the tenth of the [sugar] crop that the senhor de engenho [had] to pay to the
Order of Christ, whose estate [was] administered by the crown. Generally paid in sugar
                                           
5 Garcia  (1975), pp. 101-103.
6 Schwartz  (1987), p. 67.7
as it would come out of the [sugar] purging house (casa de purgar), it was farmed out,
the price of the contract varying with the crops or expected crops.”
7 Thus taxation was
mainly on production, not on trade.
The principle of farming out tax collection in the colony through periodical
auctions was established at an early date. Figures for tax farming contracts exist for
given years both for Brazil as a whole and for specific captaincies from the 16th to the
18th century when that practice would continue to be maintained. The incidence of the
dízimo (tithe of 10% on all products) was indeed compreehensive (including all types of
products besides sugar, such as  “manioc, bananas, potatoes, sheep, goats, chicken”etc).
8
The frequently close relationship of the contractors with local public officials would be a
constant cause of concern of the metropolis.
9
Though the dízimo (tithe) was for a long time the only tax paid within the
colony, there were also taxes on the entry and sale of Brazilian products in Portugal. In
the late 1500s, those products were supposed to pay 10% of  customs duties (dízima)
and 10% of sisa (sales tax), or a total of 20% upon entry in the metropolis, though sugar
mill owners, who shipped their own sugar , could obtain exemptions for a number of
years.
After  the union of the two Iberian crowns in 1580, a new tax, the consulado of
3%, was created in the 1590s, supposedly to fund  the construction of warships to
protect the ships trading between Brazil and Portugal. The same pretext was later used
for the imposition of another tax, the averia.  After 1630, the war with the Dutch led to
an increase in taxation to finance the recovery of the Northeast as well as the new fleet
system created in 1649. In Portugal, the right of meias-anatas, a  contribution paid by
all holders of public office such as judges and notary publics, was also created. The
definitive peace with Holland in 1661 led to the payment of a war indemnity as well as
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indemnities to persons having suffered  expropriation in Pernambuco by the Portuguese
in 1654, including the Jews  who had left Brazil, 
10 , part of which was borne by Brazilian
colonists. The dowry of a Portuguese princess was also a pretext for additional
temporary taxes, and some municipal taxes - normally excises  (subsídios) on certain
imported or local consumption goods - were levied in some cities of Brazil, even though
municipalities would never have the same importance as in Spanish America.
11
Agriculture was the basis of economic taxation in Brazil, but crown monopolies
on certain products were also renewed or created in the early 17th century to try to
bolster the crown’s revenues. “A new royal monopoly on brazilwood was established in
1605... Similar monopolies were established on whaling and salt while an estanque, or
monopoly, on tobacco sales in Portugal would be created in the 1630s.”
12 In all cases. the
contracts were also farmed out to private contractors through a system of auctions held
periodically.
The growing needs of labour in the colony were met by increasing imports of
African slaves into Brazil. Those slaves were taxed by the Portuguese crown on
embarkation in African ports increasing their final price in Brazil, even though they were
often purchased in exchange for sugar cane brandy, tobacco and other Brazilian goods.
“The slave trade was open to all Portuguese on payment of a due. The collection of dues
was farmed out, by means of an asiento  (contract) to a contratador, who delivered the
avenças (agreements) to the traffickers.”
13
The direct tax represented by the dízimo (raised  in kind as a withholding tax)
was borne by Brazilian producers. It is difficult to discuss the actual incidence of the
taxes imposed on Brazilian products upon entry in Portugal and to what an extent they
affected the prices received by Brazilian producers or were borne by final European
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consumers.  On the other hand the taxes charged on the embarkation of goods to Brazil,
also normally in the order of  20% (plus 3% of consulado and 3% of averia), were
clearly a burden on the colony’s inhabitants.
The generalized system of credit granted by metropolitan and local merchants to
the colonists, involving the use of letters of exchange since the late 16th century, with
balances being only periodically settled in currency instead of paid in kind, as it was most
frequent, coincided with a limited circulation of coins in the colony. In fact, during the
16th century barter was frequent and even the payment of pensions and salaries by the
general government was often in kind, apparently as an adaptation to the scarcity of
currency.
14
The colonists were also on several occasions and from an early date subject to the
negative impact of manipulations of the face value of Portuguese coins. For instance, in
1568 when copper coins were devalued, in 1642 and 1663 when silver coins of previous
reigns were countermarked in the metropolis to increase their nominal value by 20 and
25% respectively, and in 1688 when both silver and gold coins had their nominal value
increased by 20%, again with their intrinsic value unchanged. In Brazil, Spanish
American silver coins were countermarked in 1643 to increase their value by 50% (the
colonists of Bahia being given one month and those of the hinterland two months to
present their coins to be substituted), and new countermarks were applied in 1663 and
1679, the silver 8 reales of unchanged intrinsic value being respectively valued at 480,
600 and 640 réis. In most occasions, there is evidence of complaints of the colonists
against the levantamento of the currency, which was a clear infringement of their
property rights to the extent that nominal prices for their products did not automatically
increase.
15
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The acute shortage of coins and the use of other goods for transactions, as well
the  payments of wages,  pensions and other state obligations in kind (which was favored
by the tithe system) are widely documented also for the 17th century. However, the
Portuguese currency was the standard of value to which all goods were referred to in the
case of payments in kind and Brazil was clearly a “monetary economy”. 
16
Only in 1694 was a first mint 
17  finally authorized in Bahia to issue coins for local
use, (and with circulation forbidden in the metropolis). The law of March of that year
stipulated a seignoriage of 6.66% on the coinage of gold and silver, the same observed in
Portugal, supposedly to cover production costs.
18  The mint was later temporarily moved
to Rio de Janeiro and then to Pernambuco, before returning permanently to Rio in 1703.
Copper coins were also issued in Oporto between 1694 and 1699 for exclusive
circulation in Brazil. The difference of 10% in the value of the colonial coinage locally as
opposed to  its value in the metropolis,  to hinder the export of coins, which was
observed in other American colonies, also prevailed initially in Brazil.
19  However, after
1702, the coinage of gold Portuguese or “national” coins was also allowed in the colony,
most being exported to Portugal. In 1714, a second mint was created in Bahia. In Minas
Gerais a third mint only issued gold coins from 1724 to 1734.
The discovery of significant quantities of gold turning Brazil into the world’s
largest producer would entail new regulations and fiscal controls in the gold mining
regions, while the previously existing taxes were maintained in other regions of the
colony. The increase in production would permit a significant increase in Brazilian
coinage of gold, and to a much lesser extent of silver (after 1695) and copper (after
1729), and in spite of the concerns of the Portuguese authorities with contraband, gold
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dust would also circulate widely (despite prohibitions). Barter and payments in kind
would also continue in certain regions well into the 19th century.  Juntas da Fazenda,
independent from the Provedor-mor were created  after 1761 in the mining captaincies
to deal with fiscal affairs, and a special silver coinage with circulation restricted to Minas
Gerais was issued in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia from 1752 and 1774, after another special
copper issue in 1722. The issue of both “Colonial”and “national” gold coins continued
throughout the century and, in spite of efforts of the colonial authorities, there are clear
indications that both types of coins circulated within the colony.
Gold production was taxed on the basis of different systems at different times,
and the selling price of  gold was set by the crown and not through market mechanisms ,
a fact which was always a source of complaint of the miners. “Different forms of
collection [of the quinto (fifth) on production]... fell into two  general categories:
collection by a form of capitation tax or collection in foundry houses...[where gold was
cast into stamped gold bars or transformed into coin.]... In the space of 30 years the
search for the perfect method led the crown in Minas Gerais to go from a quota based
on a form of capitation to a foundry house (1725), to capitation (1735) and back to
foundry houses (1751). Evidence of royal frustration was the proposal floated in 1730
and again in 1752 to examine tax farming as an alternative to direct collection by the
crown, but this was never adopted. The advantage of foundry houses (from the crown’s
perspective) was ease and speed of collection, whereas collection by capitation could
result in delays of two or three years. As for the colonists, they were as adamant as they
were inconsistent in their public opposition to one or the other method.”
20
Different systems were also adopted for diamond mining, after the 1720s, when
Brazilian production flooded the world market and reduced the price of the stones. The
capitation tax levied on each slave employed after 1739 was changed in 1753, when two
separate contracts were adopted, with little success. After 1771, a General Inspectorate
                                           
20  Russell-Wood  (1987) p. 227. Boxer (1962), p. 199, mentions that “the capitattion tax proved highly
unpopular” and that farmers and cultivators paying dízimo on their crops and quinto on their slaves
were “being liable in effect to double taxation.”12
of the diamonds was created to administer directly the royal monopoly of mining and sale
of the diamonds. But “the oppressive  system of totally isolating” the diamond areas
ceased. The government monopoly would however last until 1845.
.21
As gold production faltered after mid-century, revenues of the quinto, after
exceeding 100 arrobas in the 1750s, 
22fell to an average of 86 arrobas in the 1760s and
to 68 arrobas between 1774-85 and arrears on the annual revenue target of 100 arrobas
developed.
23  In parallel, as gold production declined, the capacity to import goods
from abroad and other captaincies was also reduced, and the entradas, the taxes levied
on  slaves and goods entering or leaving the gold producing region, also declined. These
taxes, contrary to the collection of taxes on gold, were also farmed out to contractors
and arrears also developed. For fear of contraband, the reaction of the Crown included
the prohibition of the goldsmith craft in Brazil in 1766.
The supply of gold coins, especially the “Johannes” or “Joe” or peça of 4
escudos, equivalent to 6,400 réis, led that coin which was minted both in Portugal and
Brazil to become by mid-century a “universal coin of the Atlantic World” whose purity
was admired and which was often locally countermarked in the Caribbean.
24
By the late 1780s, it was estimated that the arrears of the gold taxes reached 538
arrobas. The mechanism of the derrama, through which a capitation tax would be levied
in each municipality of the mining regions to be added to the quinto to complete the 100
arrobas expected by the crown, and which had been proposed by the municipalities
themselves in the 1750s, was never demanded by the  Junta da Fazenda which
                                           
21  Silva (1987), pp. 262-3, 276.  Castello and Dodsworth  (1940), pp. 4-8, 11-13.
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23  Maxwell  (1973) pp. 47-48, stresses the consequent “fall-off ... of gold coin entering into circulation”.
24  McCusker  (1978), pp. 300-301. The exchange rate of the Portuguese gold coin against sterling in
London did not vary significantly from 1698 to 1775. In Brazil, the “weak” provincial coins were issued
at 1,760 réis per oitava from 1695 to 1702 and at 1777.66 réis per oitava from 1749 to 1822. The
“strong” system of Portuguese national currency, including the 6,400 réis, was issued at 1,600 réis per
oitava. The “Joe” was issued from 1727 to 1822, basically in the two mints of Rio de Janeiro and Bahia.
The fineness of all coins was 22 quilates (0.91666 fineness).  See Prober  (1966). p. 18.13
supervised tax collection in the mining region, and which was aware of the decline in
gold production. The threat of a derrama in early 1789 in Minas Gerais helped to
obtain the support of affluent people and tax farmers in arrears to a conspiracy which
failed, but was supposed to separate Brazil from Portugal and create a republic (which in
turn  was expected to be initially supported by the quinto). The raising of the derrama
as a capitation tax on the population at large and not only on gold producers would have
represented an infringement of  property rights and an unfair incidence on the population
as a whole, but given the 1789 conspiracy, the derrama was never implemented.
By that time, coins were already comparatively scarce in the colony and the
certificates issued by the General Inspectorate of  Diamonds (bilhetes de extração)
became in practice the first paper money in Brazil. They were complemented in 1803 by
the bilhetes de permuta of the foundry houses, issued against the Juntas da Fazenda
and the Treasury, which also circulated as currency.
25 Once the government ceased to
honour the commitments represented by those certificates, they began trading at a
discount, involving losses to their holders.
Through taxes, prohibitions and monopolies, as well as through the fleet system
implemented in 1649 and maintained until 1765, the Portuguese crown restricted
economic  freedom within the colony and its commerce, as well as a full exercise of
property rights of the colonists. An Edict of 1785 also prohibited   more sophisticated
textile manufacturing in workshops, excepting rough cotton to  clothe the slaves.
But government action through legal instruments could also favor some groups
to the detriment of others within the colony, interfering in private contracts. “The
planters’ habit of buying necessary equipment on credit for 20-30 per cent above the
Lisbon price by mortgaging the next harvest at a set price below its market value was the
cause of endless acrimony and remonstrance to the crown. In 1663, and periodically
thereafter, planters managed to stop engenhos and canefields from being sold piecemeal
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to satisfy debts, but the mercantile interest was always strong enough to prevent the
realization of the planters’ dream - a complete moratorium on debts.”
.26  This “right” was
later extended to the lavradores de cana (sugar cane planters without a sugar mill) as
confirmed by legal rulings in the 1720s and would result in legislation protecting the
sugar mills from seizure well into the 19th century.
On the other hand, while new regular taxes on production besides the quinto
were not implemented in the 18th century,  additional fiscal exactions also took the form
of extraordinary taxes such as the aids asked from Brazilian municipalities for the
reconstruction of Lisbon destroyed by an earthquake in 1755. This resulted in increases
in the already existing municipal taxes.
27
Exactions also resulted from the attacks of foreign powers, as exemplified by
British privateers in the late 16th century and the expropriations carried on by the Dutch
in Northeast Brazil. An 18th century episode is the attack of Rio de Janeiro by the
Breton corsar Duguay-Trouin in 1711. Nicknamed the “parfait gentilhomme”, he found
considerable booty in the abandoned city and received a substantial sum in coins, sugar
and cattle, as ransom for the city and the forts that he threatened to level to the ground.
The money was taken from the fifth, the mint, and a forced and substantial contribution
by the wealthiest citizens.
28
                                           
26  Maxwell  (1987),  p. 133.
27  See Alden (1968), pp. 305-307. See also pp. 279-352 for an extensive discussion of  fiscal matters in
18th century  Brazil, including the reorganization of the royal fisc, Portuguese revenues from the colony,
government expenditures, local government debt, and the expropriation of the “extensive urban and
rural properties of the Society of Jesus”expelled from Brazil in 1759-60. Among other taxes, Alden
mentions the creation of a quinto (fifth) on cattle hides at the end of the 17th century, the collection of a
10% ad valorem tax on imports between 1699 and 1719 established by maritime municipalities to
support local military garrisons, a guard tax levied by the municipality of Rio de Janeiro for the
“maintenance of the guard ship off the Brazilian littoral.” He also gives details on the entradas
established between 1710 and 1714 and levied on goods entering Minas Gerais as well as on the interior
customs stations (registros) raising transit tolls (passagens) along the trails between various captaincies
and the mining region. These interior taxes, however, would never have the same relative  importance as
alcabalas in Spanish America. On “local dues levied by town councils for the upkeep of roads and
bridges and other municipal services”and on taxation in general, see Boxer (1962), pp 187-191. For
contracts of the royal dízimos and tolls in the 18th century see Boxer (1962), pp. 347-350.
28  See Boxer  (1962), pp. 93-101.15
The arrival of the Portuguese Court in Brazil in 1808, fleeing Napoleon’s armies
would change the nature of taxation in the colony, as the ports of Brazil were opened to
direct foreign trade with other nations and as some taxes raised in the mother country
were transplanted to the colony. The landing of the court resulted in a clear infringement
of the rights of urban property owners in Rio de Janeiro, as in order to accomodate
thousands of courtiers and civil servants who had accompanied the royal family, the
government requisitioned many private houses  for their use.
By the second decade of the 19th century when the Brazilian colony was elevated
to the status of United Kingdom with Portugal (1816), the  main existing taxes in Brazil
were: the dízimo; export duties differentiated by ports; import duties; transit taxes
between captaincies; the royal quinto on gold production; the royal or national subsidy,
levied on meat, hides, sugar cane brandy and rough woollens manufactured in the
country; the literary subsidy to fund schools, charged on heads of cattle in slaughter
houses, brandy, or charque (jerked beef) ; a tax on most shops and on carriages, to fund
the Banco do Brasil; a tax on each sugar mill or distillery; a tenth of the income of urban
rented property; the sisa of 10% on the sale of houses and other urban property; the
meia-sisa of 5% levied on the sale of slaves with a profession; the so-called novos
direitos, a 10% tax on the salaries of employees of  the Finance and Justice departments
(as the Portuguese meia-anata). Several other taxes and levies including the stamp tax,
chancery rights, salt, and port taxes were also charged on  certain transactions.
Some of these taxes would remain in force until late in the 19th century, though
the dízimo was finally abolished in 1821. Tax farming of the salt tax and of whale fishing
was definitively abolished in 1801. 
29
The immediate revenue needs of the court had led to the opening of Brazilian
ports in 1808, and to the levying of tariffs on imported goods, which were initially
                                           
29  Varnhagem (1962), tome V, pp. 102-103; Simonsen  (1967), pp. 413-415; Viana  (1922), p. 192;
Calógeras  (1960), p. 31.16
regulated in the Treaty of 1810 with Britain. From then on, the road to political
independence was open and the practice  of basing the government revenues on the
taxation of international trade (rather than on production through the dízimo) was firmly
established.
The end of the colonial period was marked by further manipulation of the
currency. In the 1790s copper coins of reduced module and copper content were issued
for circulation in the mining region. The so-called escudete countermark was applied to
the existing copper coins in 1809, doubling their value, and to the previous century
special silver coinage for Minas Gerais increasing its value by 15% 
30  Spanish American
silver pieces of 8 reales were acquired in large quantities by the Portuguese treasury in
Brazil for a value  around 800 réis, and countermarked or recoined with the value of 960
réis after 1809 and until the 1820s. 
31 Soon the little gold which remained in circulation
disappeared. A final blow on the circulation of precious metals was the emptying of the
Treasury coffers by the Portuguese King D. João VI when he returned to the metropolis
in 1821.
.32 By then, circulation of copper and paper money (the notes issued by the first
Banco do Brasil created in 1808) was already predominant.
3. The costs of independence
In 1822, the crown Prince D. Pedro, the older son of the Portuguese King,
declared the independence of Brazil, as the cortes of the metropolis were trying to
                                           
30  See Coimbra  (1959) tome III, pp. 159-160.
31  See, for instance, Walsh (1830),  vol. I, p. 456 and  Coimbra (1959), tome III, pp. 158-166. Silver
coins had been previously issued at 7,600 réis per mark (of 229.450 grams) from 1695 to 1758 (and in
Bahia from 1799 to 1810, but only the 640 réis coin) and at 8,250 réis per mark from 1768 to 1802, with
a  0.91666 fineness. From 1809 to 1834 they would be issued at 8,192 réis per mark. However the
fineness of the 8 reales pieces on which the 960 réis were recoined was 0.903 or 0.896 as opposed to the
11 dinheiros silver (0.91666 fineness) used in the other Brazilian colonial coins. See Prober (1966) p.
17.
32  Viana (1922),  pp. 185 and 195-205;  Calógeras (1960) pp. 22, 26-27, 35;  Coimbra  (1959), tome III,
pp. 158-160. The royal quinto had declined from 70 arrobas of gold in 1777 to 24 in 1811, 12 in 1818
and only 2 in 1820, according to Eschwege  (1899), p. 752, reducing substantially the supply of metal to
the Bahia and Rio de Janeiro mints.17
reestablish the colonial status and economic and political subjection of Brazil to Portugal.
In this he was assisted by some Brazilian politicians  with Portuguese university
education such as José Bonifacio de Andrada, but there was no group of thinkers with a
strong background in political economy to assist the new government in formulating  the
new country’s economic policy.
José da Silva Lisboa, Viscount of Cairú, who had read Adam Smith and
supported the liberal trade policy inevitably adopted after 1808, was not succeeded by
knowlegeable civil servants and much less by figures of the stature of Hamilton in the
United States. The conduct of government matters would therefore suffer no abrupt
change from Portuguese practices.
33 The new emperor Pedro I (1822-1831) also took
power in a country with an extremely high illiteracy rate (probably 85 to 90% of a
population of some 4 million) a fact which unfavourably affected the spread of
information, the adoption of new practices, innovations  and institutional change.
Independence was a costly process in Brazil. Recognition by Portugal with the
intermediation of Britain involved important concessions to both countries. In the case of
Portugal this involved payment of indemnities basically through the transfer of
responsibility for the service of foreign loans contracted in Britain. D. João VI on leaving
Brazil in 1821, as parting gesture on the stance of the Portuguese Crown on property
rights, not only paid no more than lip service to the need to protect the Banco do Brasil
from the cash drain provoked by the decision to return to Portugal but took over assets
held by the bank, as already mentioned.
34    
But much more important in the long-term was the renewal by Brazil of treaty
obligations entered between Portugal and Britain concerning both the slave trade and
Brazilian commercial policy. By a convention of 1827 Brazil agreed to discontinue the
                                           
33 The most striking illustration of how slow changes could be in the former colony is the observation of
the Minister of Finance in his report of 1828 that that customs houses were still regulated by a foral of
1587. See Veiga Filho (1898), p. 113.
34 See Franco (1979), ch. IV. See also Viana (1922), pp. 195-205 on the report of the commission
created to study the reorganization of the treasury and the debt and currency problems created by D. João
VI’s departure and on the “independence loan.”18
importation of African slaves in three years. While this commitment remained a dead
letter until the 1840s, it provided a sound legal basis for the Britich onslaught on slave
trade activities which culminated with Brazilian legislation finally outlawing the trade in
1850 and leading to its definitive interruption. More immediately important was the
renewal in 1827 for fifteen years of the commitment entered by Portugal with Britain that
the Brazilian import tariff would not exceed 15% ad valorem.
35 Due to the lack of
alternative sources of revenue in a primary exporting economy, and given the increased
expenditure generated by the many regional political troubles from Independence to the
early 1840s, such a decision was tantamount to a situation of persistent fiscal imbalance
and led to large fluctuations of the exchange rate which plagued the Regency
government during the minority of the new Emperor D. Pedro II (1831-1889) and
persisted for a few years after he finally took power directly in 1840. The return of
freedom to tax after some British procrastination and the consequent increase in the
share of import duties in total revenue led to a marked improvement in public finances
and to a less unstable exchange rate regime from the mid 1840s. So much for the alleged
lack of involvement of the Foreign Office with business interests in Latin America.
.36
4. Fiscal issues in the Imperial Period (1822-1889)
The basic elements of the fiscal apparatus inherited from colonial times were
preserved during the first years of the Imperial period. The Public or National Treasury,
which had been established as “Erário Régio” in 1808, continued to be subject to the
instructions of the Lisbon Erário dating from 1789, until a decree was issued with new
instructions in 1829. The Juntas da Fazenda, established in some captaincies after
1761, were also in most cases maintained in the newly created provinces, also using
                                           
35 See Manchester  (1933), chapter 8. This rate was extended to other nations in 1828. See Fontoura
(1921), p. 29, who presents a detailed description of tariff legislation and of all the changes in import
duties and exemptions in the Imperial period, as well as the contemporary justifications for those
changes.
36 Brazil is a major counterexample for most of the points raised in Platt (1968) about the stance of the
British government in Latin America. See pp. 312-6. Platt also repeats the often raised but never proved
point about the damaging impact of the 1827 Commercial Treaty on Brazilian “manufactures”. Its much
more important fiscal impact is disregarded.19
regulations of the past until 1831, when Tesourarias da Fazenda were created (which
would last until 1891). The law of October 4, 1831, containing instructions to the
provincial Tesourarias, still referred to the practice and responsibilities involved in the
farming out of taxes through auctions, but given the changes in the nature of taxation,
with the elimination of the dízimo and the growing relative importance of taxes on
foreign trade, tax farming tended inevitably to lose its importance.
37
The monopoly of the brazilwood was maintained well into the second Empire and
that of diamond production until 1845. The taxation of gold according to a fraction of
production  also continued in the 1830s. A law of October 8, 1833 created a new tax on
urban slaves, excluding those below twelve years of age. There was thus substantial
continuity  in the fiscal area and even  the organization of the alfândegas, in spite of
their accrued importance, did not suffer initially any significant changes.
 38
Central government revenue in the early 1830s relied heavily on duties collected
on foreign trade: import duties, export duties and related taxes such as those relative to
docking and lighthouse. This was so in spite of the constraints imposed by the British
treaty. This is in line with predictions based on marked differences between taxes on
trade and internal taxes from the point of view of collection costs.
39 These costs are much
lower for taxes on trade, especially so if waterborn. The much higher internal tax
collection costs lead to tax monopolies while taxes on trade are rarely farmed out. The
political resistance of land-owners to taxation of land, which in many cases they occupied
rather than owned, was well known. The so-called interior taxes and duties affected
many transactions not directly related to foreign trade such as transfer of real estate,
contracts, inheritances and property of urban slaves. From the mid-1840s freedom to tax
                                           
37 See Almeida (1922), pp. 8,14,18-20,33.
38 Showing a recovery with respect to the quinto  in the late 1810s, the tax of 25% levied on the gold
produced with more advanced technology by the British mining company of Gongo Soco yielded some
128 arrobas between 1828 and 1834, according to a table of the Contadoria de Fazenda of Minas
Gerais, reproduced in Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro, IV, 1899, p. 293. In the 1830s, import
duties were levied by the Alfândegas and the export duties by Mesas do Consulado, which were
reformed in 1836-1837.
39 See North and Thomas (1973).20
imports at more than 15% ad valorem was recovered and there was some increase in
import duties. There were no significant changes in the structure of revenue until the end
of the Empire. A slave emancipation fund was created so that, together with legislation
ending slavery for newly born Brazilians (1871), the slave population could be gradually
reduced.  By the 1880s some new interior taxes had been created but revenue still
depended basically on taxation of foreign trade.
40 See table 4.1 for a breakdown of central
government revenue by types of duties and taxes.
The share of import duties in ordinary revenue after 1833 was always above 50%.
It rose to nearly 60% in the late 1830s and to almost 70% in the mid 1850s, then it fell.
But it remained around 50-60% for the rest of the Empire. Export duties collected by the
central government corresponded to slightly more than 5% of ordinary revenue in the
early 1830s. Their share then rose rapidly to almost 25%, fell to 12% in the 1850s and
stabilized at 15-17% for most of the end of the Empire. By the late 1880s it was back to
12-13%.  Interior taxes made up 25% of revenues in the early 1830s and, after declining
to almost 10% in the early 1840s, rose to stabilize around 22-29% in  the last decades of
the Empire. 
41   
Table 4.1
Brazil: Revenue structure, 1833-34 to 1888, % of total revenue
Import duties Export duties Interior taxes Maritime taxes
1833-34* 53.4 6.4 38.0 2.1
1834-35 50.7 5.7 41.7 1.9
1835-36 52.9 6.4 38.8 1.9
1836-37 61.5 17.6 18.4 2.5
1837-38 59.6 19.6 17.2 3.6
1838-39 60.5 20.1 15.3 4.1
1839-40 54.6 24.8 17.2 3.5
1840-41 65.3 19.0 11.9 3.8
1841-42 66.5 18.4 11.4 3.7
1842-43 59.5 19.6 17.0 3.9
1843-44 60.4 17.8 17.7 4.0
                                           
40 See Carreira (1980), passim. New taxes included those on railway tickets and on the consumption of
tobacco. See Mello (1984), p.249 and Veiga Filho (1898), p. 90.
41 Raw data from Carreira (1980), passim.21
1844-45 60.6 16.8 20.0 2.7
1845-46 59.8 19.3 18.7 2.3
1846-47 60.2 17.6 20.0 2.1
1847-48 57.2 20.4 19.8 2.5
1848-49 61.7 15.3 20.7 2.3
1849-50 65.3 14.3 18.3 2.1
1850-51 65.7 15.1 17.5 1.7
1851-52 72.2 13.2 13.0 1.6
1852-53 69.1 13.9 16.4 0.6
1853-54 69.6 11.3 18.5 0.6
1854-55 68.4 12.9 17.9 0.7
1855-56 67.0 12.3 20.1 0.7
1856-57 67.6 14.2 17.7 0.5
1857-58 66.0 13.6 19.8 0.5
1858-59 62.7 15.9 20.7 0.6
1859-60 63.1 12.9 23.4 0.7
1860-61 61.1 14.8 23.6 0.4
1861-62 61.0 16.0 22.4 0.5
1862-63 58.3 17.7 23.4 0.6
1863-64 59.5 17.6 22.4 0.5
1864-65 61.9 17.3 20.3 0.5
1865-66 59.6 19.6 20.3 0.5
1866-67 60.3 17.2 22.0 0.5
1867-68 52.2 22.4 25.0 0.4
1868-69 54.2 22.2 23.1 0.5
1869-70 56.4 19.2 24.0 0.5
1870-71 57.8 16.3 25.5 0.5
1871-72 59.3 17.4 22.8 0.5
1872-73 57.1 18.3 24.1 0.5
1873-74 56.5 17.4 25.5 0.6
1874-75 54.3 18.4 26.9 0.4
1875-76 56.0 16.6 27.2 0.3
1876-77 55.7 16.8 27.4 0.1
1877-78 55.9 16.1 27.9 0.1
1878-79 54.2 16.6 29.1 0.1
1879-80 55.1 15.8 28.9 0.2
1880-81 54.3 16.3 29.1 0.3
1881-82 56.9 15.3 27.5 0.3
1882-83 58.2 13.1 28.4 0.3
1883-84 61.2 12.8 25.6 0.4
1884-85 55.5 14.2 29.9 0.4
1885-86 58.0 12.3 29.4 0.3
1886-87** 59.4 13.4 26.9 0.3
1888 63.2 10.4 26.1 0.322
*Fiscal year beginning July 1st.  **Three semesters.
Source: Raw data from Carreira (1980).
The level of import duties showed an increasing trend during the Empire. The
average tariff measured by the ratio between collected duties and the value of imports
remained around 17% in the ten years before 1843. It then increased rapidly to reach
30% in 1848-49, remaining roughly between 25 and 30% until the late 1860s. It then
was increased to 35-40%, until further rises in the late 1880s to almost 50%.
Brazilian preeminence as a coffee supplier to the world market
42 had important
consequences from the point of view of tax incidence, especially so as the price elasticity
of demand for coffee was low. It was recognized already in the 19th century that
taxation on coffee exports was likely to result in increased world coffee prices.
43
Moreover, Abreu and Bevilaqua (1996) have shown that there is an optimal tariff
mechanism at work in Brazil with increased production costs caused by increased
protection being transmitted to world coffee prices due to Brazil’s dominant position in
the world coffee market. The foreign consumers ended by paying through higher coffee
prices the increased coffee costs of production. The argument, of course, applies only to
coffee. Taxes on foreign trade unfavourably affected the income of exporters outside the
core of coffee producing regions. The effect of high export and import taxes on regions
outside the coffee core was to reduce the competitiveness of Brazilian non-coffee
exports and reduce their shares of the world markets in the long-term (see table 4.2 for
the share of different commodities in total exports).
Provincial taxation was important: fragmentary and inadequate data on provincial
and municipal finance indicate that such revenues were roughly 25% of central
government revenues from the mid-1840s to the mid-1880s.
44 Due to the lower
                                           
42 In the six decades or so after independence the value of coffee exports increased at 3% a year and the
share of coffee exports in total exports rose to more than 60%.
43 See Ridings (1994), p. 195, quoting Relatório do Ministério da Fazenda 1872, p.75 and 1879, Anexo
B, p. 5-6.
44 See Carreira (1980) and Straten-Ponthoz (1854).23
collection costs provinces also relied on taxes on trade, including foreign trade. Though
provincial taxation of foreign imports was illegal according to the 1824 Constitution,
changes in legislation in the 1830s and various subterfuges created in the following
decades resulted in its widespread adoption.
According to the 1824 Constitution, it was the attribution of the legislative
chambers to “annually establish the amount of public expenditures  and to distribute the
direct contribution... to authorize the government to contract loans... to establish the
adequate means for the payment of the public debt...to regulate and administer the “bens
nacionais”[basically  property expropriated from the Jesuit order in the 18th century]..to
determine the weight, value, inscription, type and denomination of coinage, as well as
the standard of weights and measures...” It was the exclusive attribution of the Chamber
of Deputies to take the “initiative regarding taxes”.
However, the “Additional Act” of 1834 allowed provincial legislative assemblies
to legislate on the  “establishment of the municipal and provincial expenses, and the taxes
necessary to meet  them, provided they do not harm the general impositions [taxes] of
the Central Government.”
45  Consequently, the initial exclusive constitutional attribution
of the Chamber of Deputies of the Empire to create taxes  was circumvented and  what
taxes would not negatively affect the revenues of the Central Government became a
matter subject to interpretation.
As a 19th century observer noted, article 12 of the “Additional Act” , by
“forbidding [explicitly] the provinces to decree import taxes ‘a contrario sensu’ seemed
to concede [implicitly] that faculty relatively to export taxes.” 
46 However, it was
apparently well perceived in the provinces of the Northeast that “in face of the
competition suffered by [their] sugar and cotton [exports] in international markets, taxes
on exports could not be raised [without a negative impact on production] contrary to the
                                           
45 Nogueira (1987), pp. 64-65 and 86-88.
46 Veiga Filho (1898), p. 112.24
situation in the coffee provinces which, in view of the dominant position of Brazilian
production, could transfer to the foreign consumer the burden of the increase in export
taxes on coffee.” 
47
On the other hand, the word “importation”in the same article was itself the object
of discussion as to whether it included “merchandise from one province which entered
another province,” which led to a clarification by the Council of State in 1861, forbidding
the taxation of interprovincial imports. But even this was not an absolute ruling as, when
the political issue of the transfer of slaves from the Northeast and other areas to the
coffee regions became more serious in the early 1860s, the interprovincial slave trade
was burdened with both provincial export and import taxes.
Early in the Imperial period, from 1837-38 to 1850, in view of the insufficient
provincial revenues of many provinces, 
48 the central government granted them special
aids (suprimentos). The Imperial government also assumed some expenditures of a local
nature, such as those related to lower courts and the Clergy. “The Imperial government
thus posed as the magnanimous and understanding father” of the prodigal provinces,
when actually it was the main beneficiary of a system that deprived the provinces of
revenues which, in the view of many, belonged to them. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that given their budgetary difficulties, some provinces resorted to
“consumption taxes which in reality increased the taxation on imports, either coming
from abroad and from other provinces.” Since the 1840s, this expedient was adopted “at
first infrequently and timidly” by Pernambuco and other provinces, mainly in the
Northeast, with the understanding that there were constraints on  provincial taxation of
exports.
                                           
47 Melo (1984), p. 250.
48 See Veiga Filho (1898), pp. 112-113, who lists the few local taxes left to the provinces and
municipalities, the scope of which was further reduced when the central government adopted the “Tax
on Industries and Professions” in 1867.25
“In view of the favorable overall economic situation in the 1850s and 1860s,
especially for cotton, provincial import taxes remained unnoticed, except for occasional
consultations to the Council of State or in one or another aviso of the Ministry of
Finance. Things would change during the recession in the 1870s [when the price of
cotton fell abruptly] and complaints against [provincial import] taxes would increase,
culminating with the 1882 episode [when, after a “strike” of the local merchant
community, Pernambuco was forbidden by the Head of the Cabinet in Rio to levy import
taxes].”
The imperial and provincial taxes levied in the Northeast declined 30% in the
1870s. Several provinces had serious problems to face their current expenses and were
unsuccessful in floating internal loans.  The decline in the international price of cotton
and sugar prompted those provinces to reduce or eliminate export taxes on those
products.  Among other provinces, “Paraíba had to create a series of new [local] taxes,
the heavy incidence of which on the free population of the interior created the climate of
popular revolt which [would] explode in the revolt of the Quebra-Quilos.” In such a
context, interprovincial trade of both imported and Brazilian products was also taxed in
the provinces of the Northeast, at rates varying from 3 to 30%, and creative
denominations such as “disembarkation  tax” were imagined to legitimize that practice.
In the early 1880s, in spite of lengthy discussions in the legislative chambers, the
central government did not establish a new criterion of distribution, in favor of the
provinces, of the general taxes raised by the Empire. Therefore, from 1885 to 1889,
ignoring its previous firm statements as to their illegality, “the Imperial government
closed its eyes, as it had done until 1882, and accepted provincial import taxes as a lesser
evil”. In the early 1880s, these unconstitutional import taxes corresponded to about 1/3
of the provincial revenues in Pernambuco and Alagoas, to slightly less in Rio Grande do
Norte, to ¼ in Ceará and to slightly less than 1/5 in Bahia. 
49
                                           
49  Melo (1984)  respectively pp. 249-250, 258-260 and 278-281. On p. 267, he notes that the coffee
provinces did not impose consumption taxes.26
Given those developments, the question remains as to what an extent the
solvency of the central government was maintained at the cost of a fiscal imbalance of
the provinces, through the persistent refusal of greater participation of the provinces in
the revenues raised as general taxes by the Imperial government in the various regions.
  The Imperial export tax after fluctuating between 5 and 7% in the 1850s and
early 1860s, rose to 9% during the Paraguay War and returned to 7% in the mid-1870s.
50
Provincial export taxation was rather heavy in some provinces, reaching 13% on rubber
in Pará. Export taxation by coffee-producing provinces was much lower, typically 4%,
51
but in 1888 provincial taxes added to the tax charged by the central government resulted
in total export duties of 13%. In Rio Grande do Sul, in that same year, exports of meat
and hides paid 4% to the provincial government and 9% to the central government.
 52
 The following comments of the British secretary of legation referring to the
decline of cotton exports of the Northeast in 1874 illustrate how the taxation of exports
could hinder exports other than coffee: “this great reduction arises from prices realized
leaving no margin to the planters, as more than half  the value is absorbed in the expense
of carriage, provincial duties and storage and export duty of 9 per cent.”
53 More than
two decades later, also illustrating the combined negative impact of local taxation and
Imperial and provincial export taxes, “a deputy for Pará complained [in 1888]...of the
heavy export duties to which his constituents [were] subject, namely 9 per cent on the
                                           
50 The provincial export tax was often added to the imperial export tax. Thus, according to the British
consul in Rio, in 1869, “the export duty on cotton amounts to 13 per cent and 40 réis...per arroba...at Rio
de Janeiro; at Pernambuco 14 per cent and 20 réis per arroba; coffee pays 13 per cent and 40 réis per
bag. Sugar pays 13 per cent plus 90 réis additional at Pernambuco. Minor articles also pay heavy export
duties. These duties are calculated on the market prices of the respective articles at the port of shipment,
so that the planter is also taxed 13 per cent on the cost of the conveyance of his product to the market.”
See Report by Mr. Consul Lennon Hunt on the Trade and Commerce of Rio de Janeiro during the Year
1869, in British Parliamentary Papers ( from now on quoted as PP), 1870, Vol. 64, p. 232. In the early
decades of the Empire, export taxes were specific, that is defined as fixed sums in milréis per unit of
weight or length, also differentiated per product and per province. For several examples, see Onody
(1953), p. 62.
51 See Ridings (1994), p. 197.
52 Wyndham (1889), pp. 18-19 and 59.
53 See Report by Mr. Drummond on the Trade of Rio de Janeiro, PP 1875, Vol. 74, Part III, p. 205.27
value of the rubber as a state tax, 13 per cent as a provincial tax, and 2 per cent as a
municipal tax, making together 24 per cent of export tax on its value, besides the cost of
packing, freight, insurance and commission.”
54
The characteristics of the Brazilian coffee export economy only assured that the
income of coffee growers was relatively unaffected by increased import duties but these
increased duties had quite a regressive effect on the income of the urban population
which depended on the supply of imports. The effects of exchange rate devaluation
which generally followed downturns in the world economy were partly absorbed by
coffee growers. Devaluation involved an increase in costs of production denominated in
domestic currency and thus a rise in world coffee prices in the long run. In the short run
there was a weakening of world coffee prices as coffee stocks tended to be dumped in
the market following devaluation. There was still on balance a significant increase in the
income of coffee growers in domestic currency.
55      
While it is clear that the political role of the planters’ class as a whole was
absolutely predominant during the Empire, there were regional cleavages associated with
different agricultural specialization and economic interests, notably between the
Northeast (which produced sugar, cotton and tobacco)  and the coffee regions. This
issue became particularly clear when, after the interruption of the African slave trade,
export of slaves from the Northeast to the coffee provinces increased considerably.
                                           
54 Wyndham (1889), p. 18. The same report contains the following  information on export duties: “the
state export duty on sugar, which produced ￿ 80,000 a year, has lately been abolished [1887], but 9 per
cent is charged on india-rubber, cacao, Brazil nuts, hides, hair, spirits, tobacco, timber and Brazilwood,
7 per cent on coffee and 5 per cent on other things not enumerated. The export duties gave the State
￿ 885,400 during the first half of 1887;  ￿ 561,900 in the first months of 1888, of which 60 per cent
from coffee, 16 per cent from india-rubber and 4 per cent from tobacco. 5 per cent has for three years
been charged over and above other export taxes to promote emancipation but Senator Christiano Ottoni
stated on October 27, 1888, that not one slave had been emancipated with the money so received.
 In addition to this, the individual provinces raise considerable export duties on the identical articles
which pay the State export duties; for instance, Santa Catarina is now raising export duties on Mandioca
flour  6 per cent; prepared mate, sugar, coffee & c  4 per cent; beans, maize and tapioca  8 per cent; rice
10 per cent.” Subterfuges were also used by some provinces to raise disguised import duties which, as
the British diplomat recalls, were illegal. Examples included “200 réis per ton on sailing ships and
steamers” entering the port of Sergipe and an import duty of  3 per cent established in Pernambuco in
1885 “on the officially-declared values of imports under the name of ‘giro comercial’.” Ibidem.
55 See Abreu and Bevilaqua (1996), passim.28
Christie, the British Minister in Rio de Janeiro, in a report of 1862, gave emphasis to a
speech of Senator Silveira da Motta in 1861 who mentioned the dangers of secession
associated with the interprovincial slave trade.
56  After some tension, the issue was
gradually solved through the imposition by the coffee provinces of prohibitively high
taxes on the importation of slaves.
In general, however, the political class and “the deputies shared a common social
background”, converging interests and represented the landed interests which strongly
opposed ideas such as a land tax.
57 A common objective of politicians was the patronage
of local chiefs and control over positions of authority. As noted in a recent work, “ even
if the revenues from which local appointments were paid went first to the central
government before returning, that would not disturb the local  boss, whose  power did
not depend on a constituency politically unhappy with the level of taxation (which fell
mainly on imports anyway). As long as he could name his clients to all the posts in the
public service and there was no rival font of placement, he did not demand an increase in
positions and thus an increase in revenue. Moreover, he and many of his clients  were
interested in such positions more because of the authority they conferred than because of
the salaries they brought.”
58 Thus there does not seem to have been large scale
emblezzlement of local revenues nor widespread corruption to the detriment of a
majority of the population.
.59
The annual “net income” required for qualification to being a voter was relatively
high, excluding a large part of the population and particularly the poor from direct
participation in  political affairs. This was not a particularly atypical situation in the 19th
century. In 1881, with some 12 million inhabitants, Brazil had 150 thousand electors and
                                           
56 See Christie to Lord Russell, Rio, sept. 30, 1862, in PP 1863, vol. 71, pp. 115-116. See also Lago
(1988) pp. 345-347 on the speech of Silveira da Motta and for partial data on the interprovincial trade
from 1850 to 1880.
57 A land tax was included in the 1843 project of a Land Law but was rejected when it was finally passed
in 1850. It was adopted in 1880 by the Chamber of Deputies only to be rejected by the Senate. See Veiga
Filho (1898), p. 99.
58 Graham (1990), p. 180.
59 There are however references to “more corruption than in any part of the world” in the Rio customs
house in the late 1820s in Walsh (1830), vol. I, p. 447.29
some 200 thousand in 1889. In 1848 France, with a population almost three times larger,
had less than 250 thousand electors before the revolution in that year which established
universal male suffrage and which resulted in 9 million voters.
60
         A rare manifestation of inconformity and protest of the free poor occurred in 1874-
75 in the Northeast, the so-called revolt of the Quebra-Quilos, which occurred “when a
new tax imposed on the foodstuffs that peasants sold on market day, their still present
fear that the national census was designed to enslave free men of color, and the use by
merchants of the newly adopted metric system to cheat them of their due sparked a
major revolt that lasted several months.”
61
A major exception to the general lack of emphasis on policies directed towards
the free poor was the attention given by the Central government to the Northeast when a
prolonged drought caused a public calamity after the mid-1870s. The number of
casualties may have reached 200 thousand. Thus between 1877 and 1880 the
government spent almost 74 thousand contos (of which 50 thousand in 1878-79) to
alleviate the effects of the drought. (30 thousand contos were spent in Ceará alone). In
that case the population of the country as a whole contributed to the relief of a region.
62
As regards legislation towards the urban poor, another rare occurrence was the
consideration by the imperial government of tax concessions to companies willing to
construct “reasonably priced, sanitary worker housing in Rio de Janeiro”. After detailed
proposals for houses called evaneas, “the imperial government approved proposals... in
the 1870s and 1880s, and granted concessions [but] no projects were completed during
the empire.”
63
                                           
60  Nogueira (1987), p. 37.
61 See Graham (1990), p. 38 and pp. 103-105 on qualifications for voting.
62 Figures from a table in the report of the Minister of Finance José Antonio Saraiva of 1880, reproduced
in Bahia (1978) p. 265. According to a British Secretary of Legation, “during 1877 to 1879 tens of
thousands of inhabitants died or disappeared [in Ceará] and ￿ 6,000,000 was lost - i.e  to say the public
exchequer granted ￿ 400,000 for their succour soon after the commencement of the calamity”. See
Wyndham (1989), p. 31.
63 See Hahner (1986) pp.132-133.30
The government was more generous in giving subsidies, advantages and tax
exemptions, especially after the 1840s, to  manufacturing establishments of various types,
as listed in  reports of the Ministry of Finance, and which in the case of Mauá’s Ponta de
Areia large foundry and shipyard included both import tax exemptions and government
orders. The importation of machinery during the Imperial period was often exempted of
tax or subject to reduced rates.
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Table 4.2
Brazil: commodity export shares in total exports, 1850-59
to 1880-1889, %*
Coffee Sugar Cotton Rubber Total
1850-59        48.7        21.3          6.3          2.2        78.6
1860-69        45.9        12.3        17.7          3.1        79.0
1870-79        56.3        11.8          9.7          5.5        83.3
1880-89        60.5        10.6          4.4          7.6        83.1
*10 year-average of yearly shares. 1850-51 to 1887-88: fiscal years.
Source: Computed from Anuário Estatístico do Brasil,1939-1940, p.1380.
It was internal and external warfare that defined the basic features of central
government expenditure under the Brazilian Empire.
65 First there were the hostilities
related to independence in the early to mid-1820s. Then the Cisplatina wars in the late
1820s for control of what was to become Uruguay as a British-designed compromise
with Argentina. Separatist movements trying to exploit the weakness of the central
government led to civil war in the South in the 1830s and in the core of the economy in
the Southeast in the early 1840s. Expenditures of the War and Navy Departments
reached 65% of total expenditure in 1823, were in the region of 50% in the late 1820s
and still higher in the late 1830s. They were never below 35% in the more peaceful
twenty years from 1845. During the 1865-1870 Paraguay War such expenditures were
back to 65% of the total (see table 4.3 below for the official Brazilian version of the
“costs” of the war). It was only after 1870 that military expenditure fell to less than 20%
                                           
64 See Lago et alii (1979), especially pp. 7-18. For an extensive list of “factories”  receiving government
incentives and exemptions during the Imperial period, see Distrito federal (1908).
65 For data and details see Carreira (1980), especially pp. 627 and ff.31
of total central government expenditure (see table 4.4 for a breakdown of central
government expenditures).
The ratio between deficit and central government expenditure reflected such
developments, peaking with military expenditure. It was 40% in the late 1820s and also
in the late 1830s (see table 4.4). It exceeded 45% in the early 1840s and reached 60%
during the Paraguay War. In the second half of the 1870s  the succession of the financial
crisis of 1875 and the already mentioned severe drought in the Northeast generally
maintained the deficit above 20% of expenditure, reaching more than 35% in 1878-79.
Table 4.3











1864-66 35219 0 15154 3017 0 53390
1866-67 0 0 36433 22677 2 59112
1867-68 0 0 22782 53911 7 76700
1868-69 0 27000 27288 17910 0 72198
1869-70 0 0 44031 5480 180 49691
1870-71 26522 0 26146 10220 700 63588
1871-72 0 0 21 0 1225 1246
Total 61741 27000 171855 113215 2114 375925
*One conto de réis equals 1,000,000 of réis. The monetary standard was the milréis
which was written 1$000. One conto de réis was written 1:000$000. The parity of 1846
was 27 pence per 1$000.
Source: Carreira (1980), p.469.
Even in late Imperial years, central government expenditures in São Paulo, the
core of the new coffee-producing region, were extremely low, less than 2% of total
central government expenditure. Revenue raised in the province was more than 7% of
total Imperial revenue but lower than in rubber-booming Pará, and in the decadent
provinces of Bahia and Pernambuco. Important recipients of development-related
resources distributed in the late 1880s included Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul and, to
a lesser extent, Bahia. Military expenditures were concentrated in the Southern and32
Western provinces along the Parana and Paraguay rivers: Rio Grande do Sul, Santa
Catarina, Paraná and Mato Grosso.
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     During the whole Empire the fact that the geographical destination of the
expenditures of the General government did not coincide with the general revenues
generated in the various regions, the so-called problem of provincial balances, was the
object of keen discussion. In fact, in many states of the Northeast (and later also in Pará)
the balances transferred to the Imperial government well exceeded  the expenditures of
the Imperial Government in those provinces. (One of the leaders of the Praeira
Revolution in 1848 in Pernambuco, would list as one of the motives of the insurrection
“to succeed that the money raised in the province would stay” in Pernambuco).
Examining the Imperial budget of 1869-70, Tavares Bastos “concluded that of the
36,000 contos levied [as Imperial taxes by the central government in the Northeast and
the North], only 1/3 had been the object of general expenditures in those regions, leaving
a favorable balance of 24,000 contos. After deducting from that total the expenditures
relating to interest and railways, subventions to shipping companies serving those
northern regions, and the proportional quota of those provinces in the obligations of the
central government, there was still a balance of 6,600 contos”. 
67
            The question of the net balances of the North-Northeast was a reality in spite of
the fact that the South, including the Corte (the Capital city of Rio and suburbs),
contributed with 2/3 of the total General revenues and the North-Northeast with the
remaining 1/3. It was not a question of which provinces generated more resources but
rather of which transferred larger net balances. In the South, only the coffee provinces of
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro generated net balances. The South as a whole was a region
representing permanent deficits to the Imperial Government since the general revenues
                                           
66 Data for 1885-86 from Carreira (1980), volume II, p. 658-659.
67 Melo (1984), pp. 251-252. The author relies on calculations of Tavares Bastos and politicians, but
those estimates are open to debate. According to national censuses, Brazil had 9.93 million inhabitants
in 1872 and 14.33 million in 1890. The population of the Norte (North and Northeast) was  respectively
4.97 million (50.1%) and 6.48 million (45.2%) in those same years.33
raised by the central government in its provinces corresponded to only 1/3 of the general
expenditures incurred in the region.
            In fact, in several southern provinces the central government faced deficits,
notably as a result of general expenditures with European immigration and of military
expenditures. There was undoubtably a transfer of resources from some provinces to
others, associated with the strong centralization of taxes and expenditures by the
Imperial Government, but the actual “balance” of specific provinces is very difficult to
determine.
The  Secretary of the Empire was responsible for the Imperial household as well
as for expenditures by the legislative power, transfers to the Church, health, education
and eventual  relief expenditure such as those for the alleviation of the effects of the
droughts in the late 1870s. This explains the high share of other secretaries of state in
table 4.4.
Expenditures by the Ministry of Agriculture were concentrated in the payment of
guarantees to foreign investors in Brazil. Expenditure in government railways, harbours,
subsidies to steamship companies and urban infrastructure  also increased significantly in
the last Imperial years. In fact, the Secretary of Agriculture was responsible for
expenditures related to transportation systems, harbours and telegraphs, and also for
immigration.  Immigration subsidies in the late 1880s amounted to more than 20% of the
Ministry of Agriculture budget. Contracts guaranteeing the remuneration of foreign
direct investment were very common in Imperial Brazil, especially so in connection with
the development of the railway system and of the central sugar mills in the Northeast.
Frequently such contracts entailed both Imperial and provincial guarantees. All such
central government guarantees were redeemed in the early 1900s. There were in
principle no financial losses to guarantee holders which were in fact able to reap the
differential between “risk-free” interest rates on British consols and the high interest rate34
guaranteed by such contracts
.68 The total failure of sugar central mills in the 1880s in
spite of guarantees  was due to one of the most famous episodes of entrepreneurial
incompetence rather than to the government stance concerning guarantees.
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Incompetence cases could also be found in railway management. An interesting
counterexample to the idea that guaranteed contracts might be totally “risk-free” is an
episode mentioned in a British consular report. It concerns the Natal and Nova Cruz
railway in Rio Grande do Norte, whose operating deficit (working expenses) totalling
￿ 74,600 from 1881 to 1887 spurred a legal action against the company in London for
the recovery of those losses. The capital being  ￿ 549,600 and the guaranteed interest
7%, “in consequence of this guarantee the State paid up to the end of 1887 a  total of
￿ 343,227.” While the Brazilian Minister of Finance sympathised with the idea that “the
shareholders gave their money in the understanding that they were to get 7% whereas
they receive nothing of the sort...The Minister of Agriculture at once replied that they
had no reason whatever  in this complaint and that they ought to have found out before
the line was made that what it could produce independently of the government
guarantee.” The conclusion of the British diplomat is surprisingly favorable to Brazilian
interests: “British investors in these concerns have lost sight of the fact that investments
cannot be expected to combine complete security with 7%. If they want complete
security, anyone doing business in Brazil can tell them of railway debentures here which
will be always sure to pay a small percentage in gold.” Thus it is clearly debatable if in
this episode the property rights of the shareholders were or not respected...What also
emerges is the credibility of the Brazilian railway debentures.
70
                                           
68 See Graham (1968), pp. 149-159 and Rodrigues (1902). Monteiro (1993) has shown the shortcomings
of the negotiations which led to the redemption of such guarantees.
69 See Eisenberg (1974), chapter 5.
70 See Wyndham (1889), pp. 53-54. He added that “a representative of certain notable German capitalists
had recently offered to buy up or redeem the railways on which 7 per cent and 6 per cent were
guaranteed, on the sole condition that the State would guarantee 5 per cent to be actually received by the
shareholders, even should the lines not pay working expenses. This makes the question clear as his
Excellency [the late Minister of Finance] did not accept the offer of those German capitalists.”35
Table 4.4
Brazil: Deficit as a share of total expenditure and structure of expenditure by








1833-34 -8.8 41.1 47.1 0 11.8
1834-35 -14.8 36.5 49.1 0 14.4
1835-36 1.4 33.3 32.4 0 34.2
1836-37 3.6 34.9 40.0 0 25.1
1837-38 33.0 42.4 44.2 0 13.4
1838-39 17.4 44.5 42.1 0 13.4
1839-40 36.1 55.6 32.1 0 12.3
1840-41 28.4 48.6 35.4 0 16.0
1841-42 40.6 48.9 36.7 0 14.4
1842-43 46.8 46.0 37.0 0 17.0
1843-44 17.7 42.0 40.2 0 17.9
1844-45 16.1 41.0 39.1 0 20.0
1845-46 9.5 40.4 38.8 0 20.8
1846-47 7.5 40.0 38.3 0 21.7
1847-48 17.6 38.7 39.6 0 21.8
1848-49 7.5 41.6 37.7 0 20.7
1849-50 2.6 39.3 37.1 0 23.6
1850-51 1.6 42.9 35.6 0 21.5
1851-52 16.3 47.8 32.7 0 19.5
1852-53 -15.0 35.1 31.6 0 33.3
1853-54 4.7 39.9 36.3 0 23.9
1854-55 4.5 n.a. n.a. 0 n.a.
1855-56 4.0 40.3 31.1 0 28.6
1856-57 -21.8 40.0 33.7 0 26.3
1857-58 3.9 47.7 25.9 0 26.4
1858-59 11.0 41.9 28.5 0 29.5
1859-60 16.7 42.3 28.1 0 29.7
1860-61 4.4 37.1 30.9 0 32.1
1861-62 1.1 35.6 35.0 14.3 15.1
1862-63 14.7 34.7 37.3 13.3 14.8
1863-64 3.0 37.5 34.7 13.7 14.1
1864-65 31.6 48.7 24.0 12.6 14.6
1865-66 52.0 65.9 18.4 7.0 8.7
1866-67 46.4 59.6 23.6 9.5 7.3
1867-68 57.1 59.5 27.1 7.5 5.8
1868-69 42.0 53.9 32.4 8.5 5.236
1869-70 33.0 54.3 30.2 9.7 5.8
1870-71 2.3 32.0 40.2 18.3 9.4
1871-72 -3.5 22.3 39.3 12.8 5.6
1872-73 8.0 34.5 34.6 20.8 10.1
1873-74 13.6 32.4 35.0 21.5 11.1
1874-75 15.4 32.1 35.0 21.1 11.9
1875-76 18.4 21.1 35.5 14.5 29.0
1876-77 25.6 26.3 35.8 24.6 13.3
1877-78 32.8 18.8 33.7 27.8 19.7
1878-79 35.8 13.2 29.6 26.2 31.0
1879-80 19.6 16.1 41.2 27.8 14.9
1880-81 5.3 17.9 43.8 26.6 11.7
1881-82 5.4 41.9 41.2 26.8 11.7
1882-83 15.3 20.6 40.2 28.3 10.9
1883-84 12.8 20.0 38.2 31.0 10.7
1884-85 21.7 21.5 51.5 40.4 11.2
1885-86 15.2 20.6 51.1 33.1 11.1
1886-87 2.9 16.8 42.5 29.8 10.9
1888 -20.7 18.4 44.5 24.3 12.8
*Other ministries were Empire, Justice and Foreign Affairs.
**Negative signs mean superavits.
The Ministry of Finance budget included expenditures on pensions and retirement
payments and, most important of all, service on the domestic and foreign debt. In the
initial independence years public debt was mainly foreign debt (see table 4.5) but the
share of foreign debt in total debt fell continuously to about 50% in the 1850s and early
1860s. There was a recovery during the Paraguay war but the declining trend was
resumed afterwards and by the early 1880s the share was below 30%. It returned to a
level near 40% in the late 1880s as big foreign loans were floated taking advantage of
Brazil’s extremely favourable credit ratings. The central government faced difficulties in
placing public loans denominated in domestic currency  as inflation accelerated in the
1850s and 1860s. It resorted to internal loans whose service was indexed to the foreign-
exchange rate. Gold internal loans were floated in 1869 and 1881. Both interest and
amortization were payable in gold or in domestic currency at the parity exchange rate of
27 pence per milréis.
71 This increased the share of public debt indexed to the foreign
                                           
71 See Pacheco (1979), pp. 145-6, for a description of the conditions attached to the 1879 internal loan.37
exchange rate by a further 5% to 15% depending on the year (see table 4.5). Debt-export
ratios reflect the economic vicissitudes already commented upon. It is once again
important to note that an initially  high foreign (and internal gold) debt-export ratio was
gradually reduced but rose again towards the end of the Empire. Trends of the ratio of
debt service to total expenditure followed the pattern of debt-export ratios. Initially high
values in the 1820s, of the order of nearly 25%, fell gradually to reach 16-17% in the
1850s and 1860s and still remained below 20% in the 1870s, only to rise above 30% in
the late years of the Empire (see table 4.6).
Incomplete and fragmentary data indicate that the provincial funded and floating
debt in the mid 1880s was not very important: about 7% of total (foreign and domestic)
central government debt.
72 According to a British consular report, in 1887 the funded
debt   of  the provinces  was ￿ 4,174,146 and the floating debt ￿1,951,674, totalling  ￿
6,125,820, “though according to another almost equally good, though not as in the first
case, parliamentary authority, the total is ￿5,299,202.” These figures were compared to
a central government debt of ￿72,097,230 on December 31st, 1888 including ￿
28,598,400 of external debt and ￿43,498,830 of funded internal debt, (figures which are
somewhat different from those presented in table 4.5 below) and to a “total debt” of the
central government estimated by the Minister of Agriculture in October, 1888 at  ￿ 90
million. Still according to the same report, “it was in the latter part of 1888 that the
provinces for the first time began to issue foreign loans, notably São Paulo, Bahia and
Pernambuco.”
73
                                           
72  See Carreira (1980) for the provincial debt in 1885.
73 See Wyndham (1889), p. 9. He also notes that answering to a senator’s question “whether
constitutionally they had the right to do so ... the Prime Minister answered that ‘though caution was
needed, yet such necessity did not lessen the right of the provinces to contract within or without the
empire such loans as they might desire’.” Only in the republican period would the external debt of the
states become important.  According to Veiga Filho (1898), p. 269, the São Paulo 1888 loan amounted
to ￿ 714,000 and the Bahia 1888 loan to ￿ 800,000.38
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1824 1333 n.a. n.a. 48.2 n.a. n.a. 3851 n.a. n.a.
1825 5086 n.a. n.a. 51.9 n.a. n.a. 4622 n.a. n.a.
1826 4976 n.a. n.a. 48.1 n.a. n.a. 3319 n.a. n.a.
1827 4866 735 5601 35.2 86.9 86.9 3662 1.53 1.33
1828
(Je)
4806 1121 5927 31.1 81.1 81.1 4142 1.43 1.16
1829
(Je)
5519 1245 6764 24.6 81.6 81.6 3441 1.97 1.60
1830
(Je)
5332 1324 6656 22.8 80.1 80.1 3348 1.99 1.59
1831
(Je)
5332 1544 6876 25.0 77.5 77.5 3373 2.04 1.58
1832
(Ap)
5332 2498 7830 38.1 68.1 68.1 3263 2.40 1.63
1833
(Je)
5332 2795 8127 37.4 65.6 65.6 5632 1.44 0.95
1834
(Je)
5332 2972 8304 38.7 64.1 64.1 5328 1.56 1.00
1835 5332 3253 8585 39.2 62.1 62.1 6776 1.27 0.79
1836 5367 3134 8501 38.4 63.1 63.1 5476 1.55 0.98
1837 5257 2470 7727 29.6 68.0 68.0 4129 1.87 1.27
1838
(Je)
5207 2549 7756 28.1 67.1 67.1 4863 1.59 1.07
1839
(Je)
5580 3526 9106 31.6 61.3 61.3 5688 1.60 0.98
1840
(Je)
5580 3432 9012 31.0 61.9 61.9 5384 1.67 1.04
1841 5580 3739 9319 30.0 59.9 59.9 4936 1.89 1.13
1842
(D)
5580 4111 9691 26.8 57.6 57.6 4584 2.11 1.22
1843
(D)
6187 4256 10443 25.8 59.2 59.2 4708 2.22 1.31
1844 6187 4455 10642 25.2 58.1 58.1 4941 2.15 1.25
1845 6187 4828 11015 25.4 56.2 56.2 5685 1.94 1.09
1846 6187 5396 11583 26.9 53.4 53.4 5885 1.97 1.05
1847 6187 5643 11830 28.0 52.3 52.3 6760 1.75 0.92
1848 6187 5061 11248 25.0 55.0 55.0 5865 1.92  1.06
1849
(S)
6187 5527 11714 25.9 52.8 52.8 5932 1.97 1.04
1850 6183 6283 12466 28.7 49.6 49.6 8121 1.54 0.76
1851 6010 6456 12466 29.1 48.2 48.2 8083 1.54 0.74
1852 6979 6571 13550 27.4 51.5 51.5 8418 1.61 0.8339
(Ap)
1853 5872 6827 12699 28.5 46.2 46.2 9121 1.39 0.64
1854
(D)
5824 6644 12468 27.6 46.7 46.7 10439 1.19 0.56
1855
(D)
5636 6630 12266 27.6 45.9 45.9 10841 1.13 0.52
1856
(D)
5493 6631 12124 27.6 45.3 45.3 13150 0.92 0.42
1857
(D)
5345 6405 11750 26.6 45.5 45.5 10669 1.10 0.50
1858
(D)
6719 6151 12870 25.6 52.2 52.2 11372 1.13 0.59
1859
(D)
6484 6031 12515 25.1 51.8 51.8 11793 1.06 0.55
1861 7655 7254 14909 25.8 51.3 51.3 13241 1.13 0.58
1861
(D)
7432 7308 14740 25.6 50.4 50.4 12857 1.15 0.58
1862
(D)
7205 7636 14841 26.3 48.5 48.5 13424 1.11 0.54
1863 10820 8313 19133 27.2 56.5 56.5 14892 1.28 0.73
1864 7947 8558 16505 26.7 48.2 48.2 15733 1.05 0.51
1865 14735 8373 23108 25.0 63.8 63.8 16370 1.41 0.90
1866 14417 9138 23555 24.2 61.2 61.2 15786 1.49 0.91
1867 14069 9949 24018 22.4 58.6 58.6 17326 1.39 0.81
1868 13697 8869 22566 17.0 60.7 60.7 14351 1.57 0.95
1869 13064 15999 29063 18.8 45.0 56.5 15453 1.88 1.06
1870 12721 22123 34844 22.1 36.5 46.1 15439 2.26 1.04
1871 15826 28384 44210 24.0 35.8 43.3 19089 2.32 1.00
1872 15463 29724 45187 25.0 34.2 41.5 22392 2.02 0.84
1873 15053 30801 45854 26.1 32.8 39.9 20620 2.22 0.89
1874 14630 30674 45304 25.8 32.3 39.3 22392 2.02 0.80
1875 19488 32129 51617 27.2 37.8 43.8 20820 2.48 1.09
1876
(Oc)
19037 30851 49888 25.3 38.2 44.3 20573 2.42 1.07
1877
(Ap)
18501 30889 49390 24.6 37.5 43.0 19063 2.59 1.11
1878
(Oc)
17929 30224 48153 22.3 37.2 43.3 19508 2.47 1.07
1879 17154 32649 49803 21.4 34.4 40.3 19789 2.52 1.01
1880 16554 33188 49742 22.1 33.3 38.7 21249 2.34 0.91
1881
(S)
15871 38239 54110 21.9 29.3 44.1 19138 2.83 1.25
1882 15002 37204 52206 21.2 28.7 44.1 17378 3.00 1.32
1883 19036 37654 56690 21.6 33.6 47.5 19493 2.91 1.38
1884 18420 36124 54544 20.7 33.8 47.7 19504 2.80 1.33
1885 17827 32942 50769 18.6 35.1 50.0 15110 3.36 1.68
1886
(Ap)
23554 36888 60442 18.7 39.0 51.0 20502 2.95 1.50
1887
***
22952 42298 65250 22.4 35.2 45.3 23406 2.79 1.26
1888 28568 46415 74983 25.2 38.1 46.5 21714 3.45 1.61
1889 30351 48023 78374 26.4 38.7 46.4 28552 2.74 1.2740
Source: internal debt data from Levy (1995).
* Calendar year.    ** From 1833-1834 to 1886-1887 fiscal year starting July 1st.
*** Doubled second semester exports.
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1824 98 22 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1825 85 119 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1826 59 303 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1827 60 402 52 454 26.1
1828 64 294 80 374 20.8
1829 73 307 96 403 21.6
1830 55 432 98 530 28.2
1831 44 267 108 375 n.a.
1832 48 267 141 408 n.a.
1833 67 267 210 477 26.7
1834 79 267 230 497 23.8
1835 84 267 322 589 25.1
1836 84 291 262 553 24.7
1837 74 315 245 560 24.0
1838 77 312 199 511 24.1
1839 71 316 202 518 15.7
1840 71 279 244 523 17.8
1841 64 279 247 526 15.3
1842 71 279 259 538 16.5
1843 73 435 253 688 24.7
1844 90 309 270 579 21.5
1845 81 309 286 595 22.9
1846 88 309 308 617 21.8
1847 81 309 327 636 21.5
1848 75 309 329 638 21.7
1849 88 309 327 636 20.4
1850 88 314 346 660 16.6
1851 95 461 381 842 16.2
1852 103 382 408 790 21.8
1853 98 1410 396 1806 42.0
1854 99 328 402 730 16.441
1855 100 445 395 840 18.2
1856 101 396 395 791 17.1
1857 99 393 382 775 13.5
1858 102 432 367 799 14.2
1859 100 963 360 1323 24.1
1860 99 526 432 958 17.0
1861 99 552 436 988 17.5
1862 101 548 456 1004 16.1
1863 100 579 484 1063 16.6
1864 101 2911 518 3429 36.9
1865 74 616 548 1164 9.2
1866 74 977 559 1536 12.6
1867 75 997 631 1628 10.5
1868 79 1001 658 1659 15.5
1869 88 1233 832 2065 18.6
1870 92 929 1196 2125 23.1
1871 97 1070 1634 2704 26.6
1872 97 1088 1784 2872 22.6
1873 98 1114 1857 2971 22.5
1874 100 1107 1929 3036 22.5
1875 98 1357 1935 3292 22.9
1876 94 1357 2090 3447 24.0
1877 93 1411 1854 3265 21.1
1878 92 1446 2082 3528 20.9
1879 95 1532 1976 3508 26.2
1880 98 1382 2307 3689 28.9
1881 101 1426 2589 4015 31.5
1882 101 1546 2099 3645 27.0
1883 100 1452 2150 3602 26.0
1884 98 1481 2382 3863 28.3
1885 99 1431 2162 3593 30.8
1886 100 1504 2050 3554 30.0
1887 100 1707 2176 3883 27.3
1888 101 1892 2411 4303 33.8
 Source: debt service data from Levy (1995).
Several property rights issues arise from questions related to the Brazilian public
foreign debt. When the service of these loans was contractually defined in terms of
foreign currency there were, in principle, barring default, no property rights difficulties.
However, quotation of Brazilian bonds depended to a degree on the market evaluation of42
how economic policy was being conducted. Low quotations, especially in relation to
loans floated at par value, could badly affect the rate of return on specific loans.
Although quotations of Brazilian sterling loans fluctuated very significantly during
Imperial years, the end of year quotation of  Brazilian 5%s in London in 1831, the worst
year during the Empire, was 44. But during certain periods such as the late 1850s and
early 1860s as well as the 1880s credit standing was very high, exceeding 100.
74 The
Brazilian Empire was thought to have “unlimited access” to the London financial
market.
75 If  the  deteriorating debt-export ratios and falling exchange rates as well as the
continued fiscal disequilibria are taken into account it is somewhat surprising that
quotations in the 1880s remained so high.
             Much of the literature on long-term debt suggests that Brazil had a worse record
of payment of its foreign debt service than most other debtor countries. But most of
these evaluations are not relevant and are even misleading when the focus of the analysis
is the Imperial period, that is the period from 1822 to 1889.  Some of this work seeks
only to evaluate the record concerning dollar loans which were floated only after the
First World War.
76  Others analyse behaviour in the long term, starting in 1850 and
ending in 1970.
77 However, the initial period from the 1820s to 1850 which was excluded
was marked by the default of many borrowers, but not of Brazil.
       Preliminary results of a research project on this issue show that while the
counterfactual rates of return for consols remained around 3.1-3.2% yearly, actual rates
of return on Brazilian bonds floated during the Empire between 1824 and 1875 varied
between 4% and 10.3% yearly. It is of course true that the variance of yearly rates of
return was much higher for Brazilian bonds than for consols, but for most of the Imperial
loans this has to be set against the significantly higher rates of return of Brazilian bonds.
                                           
74 Brazil in contrast with most Latin American economies did not technically default on its sovereign
central government debt before 1937. In the late 1880s, Brazil converted all its 5% foreign loans  floated
between 1865 and 1886 to 4%. See  Marichal (1989), p.49 and Abreu (1988), passim..
75  Dutot  (1857), pp. 71-2. In the early 1870s Brazilian bonds normally traded in London above par. See
Mulhall (1873), pp. 7-9.
76 Such as Eichengreen and Portes (1989) or Jorgensen and Sachs (1989).
77 Lindert and Morton (1989).43
Holders of internal loans floated without indexation faced potential losses due to
higher inflation in Brazil than in the rest of the world. Internal loans not indexed to the
foreign exchange rate carried a differential interest rate of 1-1.5% over the interest rate
on indexed loans of 4-5%.
Fluctuations of the exchange rate were significant during the Empire. First, there
was a continuous devaluation from independence until the early 1840s when the average
yearly exchange rate was maintained between 25 and 29 pence per milréis. During the
Paraguay war it devalued sharply to reach a minimum of 17 pence in 1868 but in 1872-
1876 was back to 25-27 pence. Following the difficulties in the second half of the 1870s,
the milréis slowly devalued to reach a level below 19 pence in 1885-1886 and only
recovered in the last years of the Empire, when it again approached legal parity.
Inflation rates were relatively low if compared to the Republican experience but
high if compared to inflation rates in developed economies, or rather deflation rates in
most major economies.
78 The very unreliable price indices available for the earlier period
suggest yearly inflation rates of  0.9 % in the 1830s, 0.4% in the 1840s, 3.6% in the
1850s and 2.8% in the 1860s.
79  More reliable wholesale price indices show yearly rates
of -1.3  % in the 1870s and 0.3% in the 1880s.
80  If these indices are splintered they
indicate that domestic prices roughly doubled between 1830 and 1889, in line with
exchange rate depreciation from 50 to 27 pence per milréis.
        In such a situation, holders of internal debt denominated in milréis faced losses
which however were not a direct result of conscious action of the Central Government,
except to the extent that it engaged in foreign wars and public spending which were not
unrelated  with inflation.
                                           
78 Between 1830 and 1889 the US wholesale price index (BLS) fell by about 10% and the Rousseaux
price index for Britain by more than 30%. See United States (1975), p. 201 and Mitchell and Deane
(1971), pp. 471-2.
79 See Goldsmith (1984) and Buescu (1996).
80 See Catão (1992).44
5. Monetary regimes and banking during the Empire
After independence in 1822, the Banco do Brasil continued to issue notes which
would constitute a substantial fraction of the currency in circulation until 1829.
However, in 1827, given the large quantity of counterfeit copper coins in Bahia, the
central government allowed the issue of cédulas for the recalling of those coins, and
those became known as “provincial money”. This measure was to be extended to other
provinces of the Empire according to a law of October 3, 1833, which determined that
all copper coins should be recalled by the provincial Tesourarias. In the meantime,
several provinces (besides, Bahia and the Rio de Janeiro mints) had issued copper coins
including Goiás, Mato Grosso, São Paulo and Minas Gerais, all subject to counterfeiting
as the Imperial copper issues.
For the enforcement of the 1833 Law, the National Treasury issued cédulas para
o troco da moeda de cobre, which contrary to those issued for Bahia, had legal tender
and forced circulation as paper money until 1837. They were to be exchanged for the
nominal value of copper coins, less 5% which would revert to the Treasury. In 1834 and
1835, countermarks were applied by some provincial governments to copper coins to
reduce their value to one half (Ceará and Pará) and even to one fourth (Maranhão) to try
to obstruct their exit from the provinces.
81
Given those complications involving the copper coins in circulation and
extensive counterfeiting, the Imperial government issued the Law of October 6, 1835,
meant to reestablish the credibility of the copper currency. All copper coins were to be
presented for countermarking, the false coins would be confiscated and destroyed, and
the copper coins of 80, 40 and 20 réis would be countermarked with half their value.
This process was never completed and countermarked and old coins circulated in parallel
for decades. This confused situation of the copper currency in the early Empire cannot be
                                           
81 See Trigueiros (1987), pp. 68-74.45
dissociated from the unfavorable fiscal situation in the period. The repetition of colonial
practices regarding the currency, which infringed property rights, would, however, cease
after the late 1840s.
Contrary to the vicissitudes associated with copper coinage, the new Imperial
government did not debase the limited gold coinage issued until 1833, preserving the
weights and fineness of the late colonial period. But it retained initially the previous habit
of issuing a “strong” and a “weak” coinage. The 6,400 réis of 4 oitavas at 1,600 réis per
oitava corresponded to a parity of 67.5 pence per mil réis. The 4,000 réis of 2.25 oitavas
at approximately 1,777 réis per oitava corresponded to a parity of 60.75 pence. The
silver 960 réis continued to be issued at an overrated nominal value and the rare silver
coins of other denominations also preserved the late colonial standard  (of 128 réis per
oitava).
82
However, the issue of precious metals was insufficient to meet the demand for
money and by a decree of June 1, 1833 the government decided to have a uniform
currency ordering Treasury notes to be stamped in England, initiating a monopoly of
note issue by the Treasury initially from 1835 to 1838 and again from 1866 to 1889.
83
Actually, by keeping a legal relation between gold and silver coins different from the
world market relation, the government fostered a substantial drain of gold coin from the
country.
The second monetary system of the Empire, involving a debasement of the
metallic currency, lasted in  principle from 1833 to 1846 (but actually 1848 in view of the
delay in the implementation of the new laws). Gold pieces of 10,000 réis were issued at
2,500 réis per oitava, and the so-called  series of silver cruzados (including coins of
                                           
82 According to the 1833 report of the Ministry of Finance, the seignoriage on coins was respectively
6.66% for the 6,400 réis, 18.5% for the 4,000 réis and 15% for the silver coins. The legal relation
between gold and silver was approximately 1 to 13.5 when the market ratio was 1 to 16. The exchange
rate parity of the 960 réis was only 54 pence. While the commercial par was around 60 pence. See Viana
(1922) pp. 184-185.
83 On coinage in the early empire, see Coimbra (1960), tome IV. For a summary of note issue, see Lissa
(1987),  pp. 13-14. For a more extended discussion see Calógeras (1960), chapters IV and V.46
1,200, 800, 400, 200 and 100 réis) were still issued in silver of 11 dinheiros (0.91666
fineness) but at the rate of 160 réis per oitava. In the late 1840s, new legislation
established new standards for gold (4,000 réis per oitava) and silver (281.6 réis per
oitava) which would be basically maintained from 1849 to 1889.
84
As regards the par exchange rate, the Brazilian legal monetary standard had been
broken in 1833 from the pre-independence legal tender parity of 67.5 pence per milréis
to 43.5 per milréis .
85 New legislation in 1846
86 further broke parity from 43.5 pence to
27 pence per milréis.
87 While the legal definition of the milréis remained unchanged until
the end of the Empire, the Brazilian foreign exchange rate fluctuated very significantly as
mentioned in the previous section.
88
This was not unrelated with the characteristics of monetary circulation in
independent Brazil which , as already seen, was mostly based on paper currency after the
end of the 1820s. The 1830s were marked by the “scarcity of money” as Gresham’s law
                                           
84 See Coimbra (1960), tome IV, chapter XVI; Prober (1966), pp. 17-18; Trigueiros (1987), pp. 56-57,
Calógeras (1960), chapters V and VI. Calógeras presents annual figures on coinage and note circulation
between 1809 and 1853. Between 1809 and 1821,  9,192 contos in gold, 13,215 contos in silver and
1,004 contos in copper had been issued, as opposed to 8,070 contos in notes of the first Banco do Brasil.
Betwen 1822 and 1830, total coinage was some 555 contos in gold, 2,749 contos in silver and 12,124
contos in copper, while in 1830 notes in circulation included 1,490 contos of Treasury notes and 18,860
contos of notes of Banco do Brasil. From  1831 to 1835, gold coin issues totalled some 406 contos, silver
issues only 19 contos, while copper issues reached 1,456 contos. In 1835, the value of the copper coins
countermarked by the central government was 20,000 contos, replacing previous issues, while the new
Treasury note issue was 30,702 contos. From 1836 to 1848, gold coinage was limited to 551 contos,
silver issues to 71 contos while note circulation in 1848 included 47,802 contos in Treasury notes and
1,515 contos in private bank notes. From 1849 to 1853, already under the new monetary standard, gold
issues totalled 16,374 contos and  silver issues 2,385 contos, as opposed to a note circulation of 46,693
contos in Treasury notes and 5,569 contos in bank notes in 1853. See Calógeras (1960), p. 80.
Wyndham (1889), p.14, quoting contemporary official sources, advances the coinage figures of  8,114
contos in gold and 16,038 contos in silver from 1810 to 1829 and of 951 contos in gold and 67 contos in
silver between 1830 and 1849 (possibly 1848), which are roughly in line with Calógeras figures.
85 Law 59 of October 8, 1833.
86 Law of September 11, 1846.
87 See Calógeras (1960), chapter 5.
88 The new legal relation  between gold and silver was 1 to 15 5/8, and a law of July 26, 1849 established
in practice a gold mono-metallic system, by limiting the obligation of receiving payments in silver coins
to 20 milréis, and keeping the limits previously established for payments in copper coins. In the
following year, the demonetization of the old coins and the obligation of having them recoined was also
established.47
stimulated in succession the expulsion of gold, silver and copper from circulation which
became debased. Only in the late 1840s metallic circulation was again important.
89
A government-controlled Banco do Brasil had been created when the Portuguese
Court moved to Rio de Janeiro in 1808 and was liquidated in 1829 mainly in a reaction
against an experience that was thought to have been marred by gross mismanagement.
Since the Treasury was heavily indebted to the bank due to advances, its shareholders
were paid at 90%.
90 A second Banco do Brasil planned in 1833 was never launched.
There were no significant private banks before the early 1850s. Some small banks were
created, first in the provinces, then in Rio. Some financial services for coffee growers in
the Southeast were provided by comissários which acted as purchasing and selling
agents in the main urban centres and provided advances on future crops.
91 The share of
banking deposits in the means of payment rose continuously from less than 10% in 1850
to around 60% in 1889 but the ratio of means of payment to GNP was perhaps around
20% both in the late 1820s and in the late 1880s.
92
                                           
89 See Carvalho (1858), p. 42.
90 Calógeras (1960), chapters III and IV makes this the centrepiece of his strong criticism of the decision
to liquidate the bank.
91 See Laerne (1885), chapter 5 for a very good description of the role of the comissários or the excellent
Stein (1957), chapter 4.
92 See Goldsmith (1984), pp. 36 and 44. These figures are very approximate as no data on GNP exist.
Starting from a series of nominal GDP based on money supply (M2), wages paid, exports + imports and
government expenditures and on an average price index based on price series precarious both from a
statistical and a methodogical point of view, Goldsmith computed the following per capita real GDP
growth rates: 1851-60: 1.34%; 1861-70: 0.91%; 1871-80: -0.24% and 1881-89: -0.58% and the average
of 0.34% for 1850-89, corresponding to a growth rate of total real GDP of 2.04%. Allowing for changes
in the terms of trade, the per capita growth rate for the whole period would increase to 0.7%. He also
quotes the estimates, also based on indirect methods,  of Buescu of an average rate of 0.3 to 0.4% for the
period 1850-89 and of Furtado, a weighted average of 1% based on regional estimates for the whole
second half of the 19th century. Coatsworth (1997), p. 13, based on Bulmer-Thomas, records that
Brazilian exports per capita in current dollars would have increased from US$ 5 in 1850 to US$ 8.6 in
1870 and to US$ 9.6 in 1890. On p. 4, the same author reproduces 1994 estimates by Maddison which
suggest that in 1890 Brazil’s per capita income corresponded to 21% of that of the United States, while
the corresponding figures for Argentina, Chile and Mexico were respectively 49%, 35% and 25%.  On
the basis of an estimate by  Coatsworth  of a ratio of 36% for Brazil in 1800, which he acknowledges to
be possibly underestimated, it would appear that Brazil’s position in relation to the USA would have
suffered a significant deterioration during the Imperial period.48
The 1850 Commercial Code by making possible the establishment of joint stock
companies stimulated the creation of new private banks. The Banco do Brasil of Mauá &
Co. was established and eventually transformed into a new government-controlled Banco
do Brasil in 1853. The 1850s and early 1860s were marked by the increasing role of
banks in issuing paper currency: while by 1850-51 notes issued by banks were 2% of
total paper currency in circulation this participation rose to a peak near 80% in 1865-
66.
93 The Banco do Brasil acquired through take overs the monopoly of issue in Rio de
Janeiro in the mid-1850s. The consequences of successive liquidity crises led to a
reappraisal of the emission rights legislation. In 1860 issuing rights by private banks were
curtailed. In 1866 the emission privileges of the Banco do Brasil were withdrawn and the
issuing monopoly returned to the Treasury. The gradual withdrawal of Banco do Brasil
notes in exchange for bonds was provided for.
94 The issue of Treasury notes with more
credibility was particularly important in  view of the banking crisis of 1864 and of the
Paraguay war as financial uncertainty and ‘the requirements of the government on
...account [of the war] resulted in the disappearance of almost the last ounce of specie
from the country.”
95
The Banco do Brasil played an important role in alleviating the impact of
successive financial crises such as those of 1857 and 1864 as the government waived its
issuing constraints.  But there are suggestions that these stances were politically
motivated as shown by the reluctance to weather the consequences of the 1875 crisis
which led in the end to the failure of  Banco Mauá which had had, though in a much
smaller scale, a role similar to that played in France by the Crédit Mobilier.
96
In the end of the 1880s in another round of the confrontation between papelistas
and metalistas - the Brazilian versions of the Banking and Currency schools - legislation
was passed providing for a return to multiple emission but had no practical importance
                                           
93 Calógeras (1960), passim.
94 Law of 12 September 1866. On bank issues between 1836 and 1889, see Trigueiros (1987), pp. 87-89.
95 See the already quoted Report of consul Lennon Hunt on the Trade...of Rio de Janeiro...in 1869, p.
239.
96 See Pradez (1872), p.164.49
before the end of the Empire. It would be of crucial importance, however, to explain the
very expansionary monetary policies in the first two years of the Republican regime.
97
Foreign banks had an important role to play from the early 1860s. N.M. Rotschild
& Sons of London had the monopoly in the flotation of foreign loans for the central
government of Brazil from the mid-1850s until early in the 20th century. It also acted as
a paying and purchasing agent for the Brazilian government. Foreign banks were first
installed in the early 1860s: the London and Brazilian Bank in 1862 and the Brazilian and
Portuguese Bank, later renamed he English Bank of Rio de Janeiro, in 1863. The
Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland was created just before the end of the Empire.
Foreign banks became particularly important during the Republic and reached the peak
of their influence just before First World War I.
98
While the volume of paper money issues during the second Empire is reasonably
well known, and there exist records of the mintage of Imperial coins, these figures are
not sufficient to measure accurately the supply of currency in Brazil during the period,
and especially the supply of metallic currency. It has been shown that the export and
import of Brazilian and foreign coins was included in the trade statistics, and coins from
various countries were used in Brazil in domestic transactions from the 1850s to the
1880s. For instance, a decree of October 24, 1857 established  a fixed rate in milréis for
sovereigns and half sovereigns to be received by government departments. The Finance
Ministry report relative to that year justified this measure stating that it “supplied our
markets with a perfect money, well-known and admitted by the commercial world, while
saving the expense of having it recoined”. In fact, 59.5% of the 35 thousand contos
issued in gold coins of the new milréis standard between 1849 and 1859 corresponded to
foreign coins transformed into Brazilian coin, while only 32% of the issues of silver coins
in the same period corresponded to “old national coins”,  the remaining fraction
                                           
97 See Franco (1983).
98 See Joslin (1963). See also the Report of Mr. Consul Westwood on the Trade of Rio de Janeiro for the
Year 1863, PP 1865, Vol. 53, p. 72. This diplomat records that “the London and Brazilian Bank
...direction in London, capital ￿ 1,500,000...does a very important business” and registers the recent
foundation of the “Brazilian and Portuguese Bank...direction in London, capital ￿ ￿ 1,100,000.”50
corresponding to imported silver coins and silver bars. The “precautionary demand”  for
money seems to have often been met by foreign gold and silver coins in view of the lack
of confidence in the paper money of the Treasury. In the 1880s, this trend was reinforced
by European immigration, as confirmed by a British consular report which states that
immigrants working in coffee plantations asked to be paid and also saved in sovereigns.
On April, 21, 1889 the Imperial government issued a new circular confirming the
authorization of use of sovereigns in all “public and private transactions”.
99
To the extent that the Imperial coinage did not represent a significant fraction of
the total money supply, the government’s opportunities for seignoriage or to resort to
debasement of the coinage were limited. By the late 1880s, slightly before the Imperial
government authorized new private bank note issues based on metallic reserves, a report
suggested an increase in the seignoriage rate applied to silver coins by the Brazilian mint,
but this apparently was not implemented.
100 There was also no government attempt to
manipulate the precious metal content of coins in circulation through debasement. In
order to supply small change, in the 1870s, nickel and bronze coins of smaller
denominations were introduced, as no copper coins had been minted since the 1830s.
101
                                           
99 For the quotations in the text, see Lago (1982), pp.502-503.  Table 5, on p. 504, shows the various
foreign coins circulating in Rio Grande do Sul in 1860 and their value in  milréis according to the local
British Consul. Between 1846-47 and 1867-68 the “gross”imports of coins into Brazil included in
merchandise trade totalled ￿  18.8 million. The data on “gross” exports of coins are more fragmentary.
Calógeras (1960), pp. 77-78 mentions the circulation of British sovereigns in the 1850s at the rate of
8,890 réis per sovereign, later legally extended in 1875. See also Wyndham (1889), p. 12 on the habit of
hoarding large sums in houses and (p. 15) on Italian immigrants asking for sovereigns in December
1888, distrusting Treasury notes. In the same report it is stated that in 1889 besides the sovereign being
legal tender at the fixed rate of 8,890 réis “other foreign gold coins [were] also accepted at the Custom
House, but merely at the exchange of the day.”
100 Azeredo Coutinho, Necessidade de Aumento da Senhoriagem na Moeda de Prata do Brasil, 1887,
quoted by Coimbra (1959), tome III, p. 67. Coutinho was for sometime provedor of the Casa da Moeda
(mint).  On seignoriage rates in mid-century and the 1860s, see Calógeras (1960), pp. 76, 81, 82 who
mentions the rate of 14.22% for silver in 1857. There were also taxes of afinação, fundição and
moedagem. According to an already quoted British counsular report,  “by law anyone can have gold or
silver coined for them at the mint, the legal fineness of each being 0.917. The mint charge to private
persons for coining gold is 2 ½ per cent, for silver it is 9.86 per cent. See Wyndham (1889), p. 14.
101 The accumulated coinage between 1854 and February of 1889 was approximately 28,280 contos in
gold; 17,245 contos in silver; 3,805 contos in nickel and 3,799 contos in bronze. In the whole period
1849-1889 some 44,654 contos in gold; 19,630 contos in silver; 3,805 contos in nickel and 3,799 contos
in bronze would have been coined in Brazil. See Calógeras (1960), pp. 80 and 88 for the raw annual
data. Wyndham (1889), p. 15 presents totals of gold and silver coinage between 1849 and 1859 of
respectively 37,230 contos and 8,182 contos, and of  8,411 contos in gold and 10,787 in silver between51
In summary, there was no infringement of property rights in the area of metallic currency
after 1849 and this may again be related to more balanced government accounts to which
a greater capacity to tax foreign trade after 1844 gave a significant contribution.  On the
other hand, as in other countries, such as the USA during the Civil War, the issue of
inconvertible currency by the Treasury, notably during the Paraguay war, in an
inflationary context, did represent the imposition of an “inflationary tax” which reverted
fully to the government in the periods of Treasury monopoly of note issue.
Given the limitations of scope of this paper it is not possible to deal adequately
with the question of how property rights were affected by the imperfection and laxity of
government regulations concerning the rights of emission of  banks, the banks’
imprudent behaviour and government rescue generally through the generous discount
windows of the Banco do Brasil. While it does not seem that there was any important
direct use of taxpayers’ money, there were macroeconomic consequences linked to the
accommodating monetary policies adopted by the government. Moreover, at the
microeconomic level, deffective regulation in 1857 and 1864 made possible the
overextension of financial houses which went bankrupt. This was not of course
something which happened only in Brazil, such financial crises being ripples of financial
crises at the centre of the world financial system. But the total net losses entailed by
bankruptcies in Brazil were equivalent to 50% of the means of payment in 1864. The
liabilities of A.J. Souto & Cia in 1864 were of about  ￿ 4 million,  not too different from
the  ￿ 5 million of Overend, Gurney of London two years later.
102    
6. Conclusions
                                                                                                                               
1859 and 1887. Still according to Calógeras, in 1888 the total note issues of the Treasury and banks in
circulation reached 205,288 contos, of which 188,869 were Treasury notes. An idea of the drain that the
supply of metallic currency could suffer in given years through exports, and elements of comparison
with the above figures, are provided by the following data based on raw figures from a consular report:
the total official value of exports in the fiscal year 1876-77 of 101,047 contos included exports of 5,833
contos of gold and silver coin and between 1879-80 and 1881-82 out of a total official value of exports of
315,769 contos, 5,135 contos corresponded to gold and silver coin and 522 contos to paper money. See
Report by Mr. Sandford on the Commerce of Brazil during the last 15 years, PP 1884-85, vol. 76, part
IV, Commercial no. 40 (1884), pp. 368-69.
102 See Calógeras (1960), p. 145, Goldsmith (1984), p. 44, and Clapham (1966), p. 263.52
Based on the analysis presented in the previous sections on public finance and the
monetary regime during the Brazilian Empire it would seem that, if account is taken of
the property rights record in relation to non-financial assets (land, - but especially the
emancipation of some 600 thousand slaves without compensation), the record
concerning financial assets was rather  good.
Periods of lax monetary and financial regimes policy were in general politically
determined: the long crisis of independence, war in the River Plate and the Regency
before D. Pedro II’s coronation; the Paraguay War; the difficult years during and
following the big drought in the late 1870s. It is not difficult to detect similar periods
also in the financial history of mature metropolitan economies.
It would seem that most of the criticisms which could be levelled to particular
aspects of fiscal, monetary and financial policies would be somewhat blunted by the
recognition of the structural limitations of decision-making processes in an economy
geared to commodity exports using cheap labour. Otherwise a full counterfactual
exercise of how the Brazilian economy would have behaved, if say the constraint on
slave imports had become really binding in 1830 or if land policies had been similar to
those adopted in other economies unconstrained by land availability, would be needed.
It was thus a direct consequence of the political power of landowners that
taxation relied mostly on duties on foreign trade. That the increased production costs of
coffee due to high protection as well as export taxes could be shifted to coffee
consumers probably delayed the introduction of significant “interior” taxation such as
excise and income taxes which had to wait until World War I. The financial record of the
Empire was extremely good especially under D. Pedro II (1831-1889). This applied to
public foreign debt  as well as to the high rates of return also guaranteed to direct foreign
investment. While this latter treatment may have been overgenerous, the policy must be
put into perspective by the great frictions between government and foreign suppliers of53
public services in a context of foreign exchange devaluation during the Republican
regime.  It was also during the Republic in the 20th century that unilateral moratoria on
the foreign debt would be declared by Brazil (1930s and 1987).
A strong conclusion which comes out of this preliminary stocktaking having in
mind monetary, fiscal and financial developments since 1889 is that any evolutionary idea
about the consolidation of the respect of property rights by the Central Government as
regards financial assets or less discriminatory taxation must be ruled out. With all the
imperfections of government policies during the Empire, and in spite of a consolidation
of private law and of the judicial system in the 20th century, as well as of a better
definition and registration of landed property, developments without any precedent have
since then unfavourably affected property rights from the perspective adopted in this
study. A short list of such developments would have to include: government interference
in the distribution of foreign exchange cover, default of foreign debt service, increased
restrictions on the right of establishment of foreign firms including financial
intermediaries, compulsory sales of government “loans”  and highly inflationary
government financing. Finally, there were recent (1990) episodes of freezing of financial
assets in the context of failed stabilization attempts which were indeed akin in their
treatment of property rights to what the colonial derrama might have represented.54
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